University of Mississippi

eGrove
Honors Theses

Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale
Honors College)

2007

To Vote or Not to Vote: The New Challenge to Mexican
Democracy
Elizabeth Thea Harrington

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis

Recommended Citation
Harrington, Elizabeth Thea, "To Vote or Not to Vote: The New Challenge to Mexican Democracy" (2007).
Honors Theses. 2344.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis/2344

This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College (Sally McDonnell
Barksdale Honors College) at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized
administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

To Vote Or Not To Vote? The New Challenge To Mexican Democracy

By
Elizabeth Harrington

May 2007

Oxford, MS

A thesis submitted at the University of Mississippi,
presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion
of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies at the Croft Institute
for International Studies, in conjunction with requirements set forth by
the Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College.

Approved by

Advisor: Dr. Leslie Schwin(^-Bayer

Reader: Dr. Michael Mete,

ReaiiSfT^r. Douglass Sullivan-Gonzalez

©2007
Elizabeth Harrington
All Rights Reserved

2

Abstract
Elizabeth Harrington: To Vote or Not to Vote?
The New Challenge to Mexican Democracy
(Under the direction of Dr. Leslie Schwindt-Bayer)
Mexico is country which has successfully transitioned from authoritarianism to a
functioning young democracy. Yet the democratic stability of Mexico is already at risk
due to a trend of declining voter turnout. Despite the most competitive elections in
modem Mexican history, voter participation in 2006 was only 58%,down nearly 20%
from 1994. Though a variety ofreasons contribute to decreasing voter turnout, the
predominant factor in Mexico is disillusionment, which manifests itself in the Mexican
population because of four principal causes: widespread cormption, government
inefficiency, election fraud, and a lack of change in the daily lives ofthe people. To
support my argument, I use data from Transparency International, the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance(IDEA), the National Institute for
Geographic and Informational Statistics(INEGI), and the World Bank. I also address
alternative hypotheses, as well as compare Mexico to its Latin American neighbors.
Voter turnout is a measure of how strongly citizens believe in the integrity of their
government and in democracy overall. Declining voter turnout threatens the future of
democracy in Mexico because decreased citizen participation reduces the legitimacy of
the government. Large numbers of non-voting Mexicans indicate the populace does not
approve of the government’s trajectory and/or performance. Because universal
participation is at the heart of a democracy, situations where large numbers of citizens
abstain from voting pose a danger to the continuance of democracy. Mexico must
address the main causes of voter abstention and work to reverse the trend of declining
voter turnout in order to preserve its newly created democracy.
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Chapter 1: The Study of Voter Turnout Is Vital as an Indicator of Democratic Health
Today’s world continues to grow smaller due to a combination offactors relating
to globalization. Because ofincreasing global interconnectedness, the democratic health
of one nation has an effect on countless other nations in that region and in the world as a
whole. The advancement and welfare of a democracy sets a precedent with which the
other nations in the region may compare themselves. Voter turnout is a key indicator of
democratic health, where high voter participation indicates acceptance ofthe government
and its policies. By participating in the formal political structure, voters show support for
and thereby legitimize their democratic government. “Democratically elected
governments are more legitimate when a higher percentage of the population votes”(DID
2005). Turnout measures how strongly citizens believe in their democracy, and how
much impact they feel they have on their government. Studying voter turnout reveals the
status of a democracy and its approval among the populace. It measure the strength,
adaptability, and sustainability of democracy as a form of government in a given country.
“Turnout is a key indicator of democratic responsiveness and health”(Fomos et al. 2004,
910).
Political scientists have studied voter turnout for decades, and this topic continues
to have great relevance to democratic systems(Fomos et al. 2004). Democracies can be
found on every inhabited continent in the world, and many countries across the globe are
consolidating their transition to democracy. Elections today are arguably the most

6

competitive in history, because they are freer and fairer than ever before due to
transparency mechanisms, increased emphasis on electoral integrity, and international
election observers.
Today, Mexico is hailed as a country transitioning from a quasi-authoritarian
regime to a young democracy. Because it is in this evolutionary process, questions
regarding voter participation are increasingly important. Lower voter turnout can
threaten the health of a democracy, particularly new democracies like Mexico.
“Elections serve primarily to legitimize existing policies and to demonstrate mass support
for the regime. If voter turnout is not high enough... the legitimacy ofthe regime is
diminished”(Klesner and Lawson 2001,20). In Mexico, voter turnout reached its peak
in 1994 with nearly 80% participation and has since fallen to 64% and 58.6% in the 2000
and 2006 presidential elections, respectively. What accounts for the recent decline in
voter turnout in Mexico?
Little research has been done on the sources of electoral fluctuation in Latin
America(Roberts and Wibbels 1999, 575). One repercussion of electoral instability is
falling voter turnout. This study attempts to analyze the problem of declining voter
turnout in Mexico by identifying the key cause of this reduction in participation. In my
research, I have found that five key factors influence voter turnout: political institutions,
socioeconomic dynamics of the population, demographics, strength of group
mobilization, and disillusionment. Ofthe various factors which have an effect on voter
turnout, the most overlooked but arguably greatest contributor in Mexico is
disillusionment. Disillusionment manifests itself in the Mexican population because of
four principal causes: corruption, government inefficiency, election fraud, and a lack of

7

change in the daily lives ofthe Mexican people. I will begin this study with a brief
historical background of the Mexican elections. The study then shifts to detailed
explanations of each ofthe four contributors to disillusionment. Next I address
alternative hypotheses regarding voter turnout, showing why none ofthese adequately
explain the decline of voter participation in Mexico as disillusionment does. I will also
compare Mexico’s voter turnout to other Latin American countries to get a sense of
Mexico’s participation rates within the American region. I will argue that because
Mexico is a leader in Latin America and particularly Central America, democracy must
be insured in this country or the whole region is at risk of abandoning the democratic
structure ofgovernment. Finally, I will conclude that the greatest contributor to the
decreasing voter turnout rates in Mexico is disenchantment among the population.
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Chapter 2: A Brief Historical Background of Mexican Elections
Mexico successfully projected a fa9ade of democracy for decades under one party
rule. The PRI(Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or the Institutional Revolutionary
Party) governed Mexico steadily from 1929 until 2000, practicing a hegemonic and semi
authoritarian model of governance. PRI did not lose a presidential, gubernatorial, or
federal senatorial race that it participated in from 1929 through 1988. PRI achieved such
a remarkable ruling record through ‘uncompetitive’ elections which lasted until the mid
1990s(Brophy-Baermann 1994). While some scholars—and certainly the PRI itself—
claimed Mexico was never considered a one party system, the widely accepted opinion is
that PRI held a monopoly on the Mexican party system. PRI dominated the presidency
for seven decades, but always had an opponent(the government even funded opposition
parties) to support that facade of democracy (albeit an ill-functioning one, in retrospect).
Voter turnout in Mexico in recent years has been sporadic at best. This paper will
focus on the most recent elections, beginning with 1994. Prior to that, voter turnout
hovered in the 60% range, peaking at 75% in 1982. The 1988 elections are shrouded
with controversy about authentic electoral turnout, and thus the reliability ofthe 50%
reported participation is in doubt. In stark contrast to 1988, the 1994 elections are
generally accepted as relatively corruption free. Participation was also high, indicating
acceptance ofthe political system.

9

Chart 1.1
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Source data: IDEA International. 2006.

Changing Voter Turnout in tlie 1990s
Beginning in the 1990s, “patterns of voter turnout have changed dramatically/’ as
evidenced by the graph above (Klesner and Lawson 2001, 17). While organizations like
the Carter Center praised Mexico for its 64% turnout in 2000, this figure is low by
Mexican voting standards. The increase of disenfranchised voters due to disenchantment
undoubtedly contributes to this decline.
Past voter turnout in Mexico was relatively high. Mexico employs a compulsory
voting mechanism, a proportional representation system, and democratically structured
institutions. Mexico has a compulsory voting clause in its constitution, which mandates
voter participation in elections. Quite obviously, given the declining rate of participation
in the two most recent elections, voter turnout is not strongly affected by requirements to
participate. Opponents of compulsory voting argue that “[forcing people to vote in what
they believe are fraudulent or meaningless elections breeds cynicism about democratic

10

processes and betrays core democratic principles”(DID 2005). This might well be the
case, but given that Mexico does not adequately enforce its compulsory voting, this likely
is not indicative ofthe Mexican scenario. Proportionally representative systems allow
smaller parties a greater chance ofrepresentation in congress, so voting for a smaller
party does not signify voting for a lost cause. This was not always the case, however.
Because ofPRI’s hegemonic position, smaller parties had little chance of winning.
Logically, this monopoly on power would deter high voter turnout, especially among
opposition party supporters, because voting for any party other than PRI would be
pointless. Yet, in 2006, when literally every vote counted in Felipe Calderon’s win by
less than one percentage point, voter turnout was far less than it was under PRI rule.

What explains the fluctuations in voter turnout?
Changing PRIsupport
Why do previously encouraging factors no longer foster higher voter turnout?
One reason is voter turnout patterns have changed drastically. The change in voting
trends in Mexico became evident as PRI lost its stronghold on power. The erosion ofPRI
hegemony resulted in greater voter mobility and a more unstable electoral environment
(Roberts and Wibbels 1999). As PRI gradually lost its political domination, it forfeited
its ability to reward faithful supporters with gifts and other loyalty benefits (like Progresa
social welfare money,for example). This resulted in a failure to keep people involved,
especially once PRI lost the presidency (Klesner and Lawson 2001).
PRI loyalists compose anywhere from 13 to 20% of the population (Mexico 2006
Panel Study; Klesner 2005). These loyalists are unequivocal PRI voters come election
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time. PRI’s support base is composed ofrural, older, and less educated voters. Both
Labastida in 2000 and Madrazo in 2006 benefited from the this type ofsupport. In 2000,
those with no education were twice as likely to vote for the PRI than any other party, and
those who earned less than the minimum wage and older voters were more likely to
support PRI(Klesner 2005). The attitude towards PRI is shown to be less stable among
those with higher than secondary education(McCann and Lawson 2003). As Mexico’s
population becomes more educated,PRI support is consequently weakened. Also, as PRI
lost its mechanisms for mobilizing the less educated voters, through state and party
sanctioned union membership for example, voter turnout for PRI declined,

The decline

of union organizations signifies a decline in the power and scope ofinstitutions that
worked to ‘get out the votes’... especially for peripheral voters”(Gray and Caul 2000,
1115). Because formerly mobilizing organizations, such as unions, have declined in
membership, they have fewer people to motivate to vote. Former umon members, for
example, may have had no other involvement politically, and once they were no longer
part of a union, they had no one at all to encourage them to go to the polls. Former union
members traditionally voted in high numbers for the PRI, which had influence over the
national union umbrella organization(CHOP: The National Confederation ofPopular
Organizations).
Economic crises also contributed to declining PRI power. PRI divided its support
base with economic reforms implemented in the 1980s and 1990s, especially those under
Miguel de la Madrid(McCann and Lawson 2003). It was during this time of great
economic policy change that the PRI split, creating a new,smaller party called the Party
ofthe Democratic Revolution(PRD). The rich got richer and the poor poorer under these
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new PRI policies, earning PRI the reputation of pursuing a kind of“politics offuture
propensity”(Pastor and Wise 2005, 139). These policies alienated PRI’s most
unwavering circle, eroding its legitimacy with this base of political support.
This combination offactors resulted in a smaller portion ofthe population who
identified with the PRI. The electorate began to switch partisan affiliations depending on
its key political concerns (Pastor and Wise 2005). Some former PRI supporters changed
their political affiliation to either PAN (the National Action Party, a center-right party) or
PRD (center-left), but many chose no new party at all.
For decades,PRI party strength determined turnout rates(Klesner and Lawson
2001). The higher the turnout in a given area (especially in poor, rural areas), the better
the PRI did. Thus, the better the opposition to PRI did, the lower overall turnout was.
This pattern has changed as PRI has lost strength, however. PRI no longer enjoys the
wide influence over states that it formerly had (especially now that it has lost the
presidency). Now that states have more independence from the federal government, they
are able to resist PRI’s pressure to carry out certain activities.

The more marginalized

states vote more and more with the PRI than do the less marginalized states”(Klesner
and Lawson 2001,21). As states’ power increases and they become less susceptible to
coercion, they become less marginalized, and therefore PRI has less influence and less
success.

Less unconditionalpartisan support
A person’s alliance with one party in a given election does not guarantee support for the
same party in the next election. This evidence shows the instability of party alliances in
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Mexico. More than 60% of voters are uncommitted to a political party, and one third of
the population considers itself fully independent(Rubio 2004; Mexico 2006 Panel
Survey). Klesner finds that unattached voters tend to be younger(Klesner 2005). This
trend of detachment, which could easily result in not voting at all, is becoming
entrenched in groups which will impact voter turnout for generations to come. Similarly,
former PRI followers could also have withdrawn from the political scene altogether,
because none ofthe parties offers great enough incentives or initiatives to mobilize them
to vote. This lack ofcommitment to a party helps account for why people are not as
involved politically anymore, and therefore do not vote as regularly or at all.

Democratic changes underway in Mexico
Mexico has undergone profound political changes over the last few decades. It
has emerged from a hegemonic,PRI-dominated system to one with competitive elections
at all levels of government. One might expect that more democratic practices, such as
more open and fair elections, would increase voter turnout as the electorate senses its
greater influence over government. Counterintuitively, Mexico’s shift to democracy may
actually discourage higher voter turnout because ofthe additional responsibility it puts on
voters. Democratic transitions require more of voters because of the added duty of
making informed political decisions prior to voting(McCann and Lawson 2003). In
theory, a more democratic system is desirable for the people of a nation because it allows
them greater say in governmental affairs, simultaneously holding government officials
more accountable. But voting in the context of a fully functioning democracy

^rather

than just being a referendum on the regime(as elections were previously under the
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PRI)—^necessitates more effort on the part ofthe citizen, because he/she must take into
account more considerations prior to voting(McCann and Lawson 2003). This transition
makes for a more demanding and complicated environment,resulting in a “poUtical
context[which] seems to have been disorienting for many voters”(McCann and Lawson
2003, 77). With a more confusing electoral setting, voters who formerly found voting a
relatively easy task were suddenly faced with greater difficulties due to the need to make
more informed decisions regarding voting prior to the elections. It is very likely that at
least some ofthese voters who felt unable to transition to this new environment withdrew
from electoral participation completely.
While Mexico’s evolution from an authoritarian regime to a fully functioning
democratic structure would imply greater voter turnout, this is not the case in Mexico.
Voter turnout is declining in the newly competitive environment, and the root causes of
this phenomenon must be examined so that actions may be taken to reverse this damaging
trend.

Disillusionment is the most importantfactor in the phenomenon ofdeclining voter
turnout in Mexico
Overwhelmingly, the greatest contributor to the change in voter turnout is
increased disillusionment. Decreased PRI strength explains how the PAN achieved its
increased position of power, but did not change the electorate’s opinions towards
government. Disenchantment among the populace remains. The hope of real and lasting
change as a result of the election of Vicente Fox to the presidency in 2000 yielded
disappointing results. PRI and PAN both proved through their current trajectories that
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they cannot change the negative attitude ofthe people towards the government.
Corruption, electoral fraud, a lack ofimprovement in peoples’ daily lives, and
government inefficiency combine to create an air of disillusionment towards the
democratic system in Mexico. The populace displays this disenchantment through not
voting, which threatens the future stability of democracy in Mexico. Addressing the root
causes ofthis disillusionment allows governments to take decisive and informed action to
combat the growth of declining voter turnout.
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Chapter 3: The Effect of Corruption on Voter Turnout in Mexico
Corruption is a word that has long been synonymous with the Mexican political
system. Corruption manifests itself in a variety of ways,ranging from using one s
position to unduly influence others, to acting for one’s personal benefit rather than in the
interest of what is best for the country overall, to blatant vote bu)dng. The negative
impact of corruption is obvious: among other things, it reduces the legitimacy ofthe
Mexican political structure, thereby making citizens less inclined to support it. If elected
government officials are going to act in their own self-interest, regardless ofthe votes or
opinions voiced by constituents, few incentives exist for the populace to contmue
participating in the formal governmental system, particularly through voting. As
corruption becomes entrenched in the political system, the establishment s integrity
diminishes and disillusionment among the populace grows, manifestmg itself through
declining voter turnout, among other things. Corruption in Mexico is seen by many as an
integral part ofthe system, and only drastic changes will alter this condition.
According to Merriam Webster,corruption is “the impairment of integrity, virtue,
or moral principle”(2007). Similarly, Transparency International, from which much of
the survey data used in this section is taken, defines corruption as “the misuse of
entrusted power for private gain”(2007). In modem Mexican history, corruption grew
to be an inherent part ofthe political stmcture during PRI’s 71-year mle. In authoritarian
stmctures, corruption is often present because there is no check on institutional power. In
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Mexico, the government itself perpetrated so much ofthe corruption and for decades had
no real incentives to reduce the corruption. Corruption even helped PRI keep power for a
time, by rewarding faithful supporters and appeasing both sides ofthe political spectrum
through corruption. Furthermore,PRI kept corruption from becoming too publicized,
taking advantage of its media censorship. Over time, however, corruption became more
of a hindrance to PRI power than a stronghold on it. Both the very presence of corruption
and the publicity ofit grew to the point that corruption became a debilitating aspect of
PRI’s authority and led to its eventual loss of governmental power (first in the Congress,
then the presidency). Unfortunately, corruption has not vanished with the removal ofPRI
from the presidency. Fox entered office with years ofinstitutional corruption in place,
and his tenure did not prove to significantly reduce the persistent problem of corruption
by any significant measure.
Corruption poses a threat to democracy because it is inherently immoral and selfbenefiting. Corruption negatively influences voter turnout because it gives the
impression offoul play and contributes to illegitimacy in a government. If a government
does not act fairly or in the best interest ofthe people, particularly if corruption is
consistent, citizens have little motivation to support the corrupt system,

If citizens

believe that corruption is an inherent component of a democratic regime and not merely
attributable to an individual political leader or institutions, this may weaken support for
democracy as a form of governance”(Canache and Allison 2005,93). When cormption
is expected—^both by outsiders and the people of the country itself a nation faces a
serious problem. Disenchantment with the political structure grows out of this latent and
widespread corruption that Mexican politics has and continues to embody. Scandal
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continues to taint elected officials in Mexico, with new allegations of misconduct
surfacing on a regular basis”(SourceMex 2004). Corruption very significantly affects
political life, at least for 62% of people interviewed in 2003(Global Corruption
Barometer 2003).
Corruption is commonplace at all levels of government, notjust the federal
entities.

Corruption in Mexico is by now thoroughly institutionalized and operates at the

local and state as well as the federal level”(Reding 2000,61). Corruption exists not only
at different levels of government, but it also takes many forms at these various levels.
Corruption is so widespread, in fact, that it seeps into seemingly endless categories,
ranging from drugs to bribes to governmental favoritism, and much more. Everyone that
this author spoke to while in Mexico confirmed the presence of corruption in the political
system and claimed to take it into consideration when voting.
Corruption undermines the integrity ofthe political system, negatively influencing
the attitudes of the electorate towards its government. If citizens are dismayed enough,
they may choose not to vote as a means of displaying disapproval towards the current
government. The dissent may come fi*om bribery, unfair promotional opportunities,
nepotism, multifaceted political scandal, or a combination ofthese or other factors.
Increased media coverage on these dishonest activities is also a likely contributor to
growmg disenchantment towards the government. More affluent citizens are more likely
to have the spare time and resources available to engage in activities to influence the
government’s actions, such as starting independent watchdog organizations or wnting to
their representative. Given that the majority of Mexicans are poor with fewer time and
money resources, a majority of the population has limited options available to take
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meaningful(without being revolutionary) action. One such option, which does not cost a
person anything financially, is to abstain from voting. By not voting, a person actually
saves time that might have otherwise been spent going to the polls. Therefore, not voting
is a simple way to protest against the government’s actions and requires considerably less
effort than other means of disputing the affairs of government.
The immediate casualty of voters during Mexico’s ‘transition to democracy were
the poor. When the PRI stopped mobilizing marginalized sectors of society to vote, by
giving incentives(or threats) to vote, these sectors no longer had explicit motivation to
vote and thereby became disenfranchised. Without a unifying orgamzation to encourage
them to vote, these former voters may simply drift out ofthe political sphere and be lost.
These same people are not being repoliticized because ofthe relatively small potential for
personal gains which come from voting. Corruption has nearly an omnipresence in
Mexico, which characterizes more than just the PRI. As PAN administrations have taken
over,levels of corruption have minimally decreased or stayed the same (see Chart 3.1).
To some, this may be evidence that regardless of which party is in power, little is
changing. It could also mean that people perceive there to be little difference between the
parties, as the results oftheir administrations have not been profoundly different.
Particularly poorer or less educated voters, who have less access to detailed political
accounts, may perceive the government to be so corrupt that voting will have little impact
on the government’s actions.
Because ofthe link between voter turnout and governmental corruption, one
would expect increased levels of corruption to correspond with reduced voter turnout. I
expect voter turnout to increase as levels of corruption decrease, because a society with
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little corruption is more democratic and thus more inclined to vote. Not all the data I
gathered supports this idea, however,so my discussion shifts to the reasons for why this
data may not support my conjecture.
A major challenge in measuring the amount of corruption in a country, and then
comparing that point over time, is that corruption is difficult to quantify. While living in
Mexico,I heard an array ofopinions about corruption and its prevalence, but I had no
way to compare these verbal opinions across cases, or tangibly represent the knowledge I
gained in numerical values. Luckily, Transparency International: The Global Coalition
Against Corruption(TI) developed a way to rate levels of corruption in a country based
on the perceptions ofcorruption by business people and country analysts. The
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)assigns an overall numerical score to a country’s
corruption level on a scale of0-10, where 0 is “highly corrupt” and 10 is “highly clean.”
It measures institutional corruption, along with the impact of corruption on daily life,
future expectations of corruption, and how effectively the government is working to
reduce corruption. The CPI utilizes multiple government and business survey

sources m

gathering data, and a country must be included in at least three surveys to be included in
any of TI’s analyses. In short, the CPI is a tangible way to measure the level of
corruption in a country from year to year.
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Chart 3.1

Mexico's CPI Rating
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Source data: Transparency Intemationars Corruption Perceptions Index, years 1995-2006.

CPI is a valuable resource in analyzing the role corruption might play in declining
voter turnout in Mexico. Chart 3.1 shows the relatively little fluctuation in CPI in the
given time period, meaning the relatively high levels of corruption measured in 1995 in
Mexico have not notably improved over the past decade. Overall, Mexico has only
improved its CPI rating from 3.18 to 3.3, a modest amount with just over one-tenth of a
point improvement over two separate administrations. Mexico s score of 3.18 in 1995
ranks among the bottom third of countries measured, showing that Mexico has a higher
presence of perceived corruption tlian the majority of other nations.
The CPI, among other corruption assessing indices, shows the people tliat their
government is not taking adequate action against corruption. Since the Mexican
government has long been the perpetrator of corruption, it is essential that it take leading
actions to stop the persistence and growth of this dishonesty. Because voting is a primary
way to show faith for the integi'ity of a governmental system, voter turnout would be
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among the major casualties of the government’s inability or lack of desire to genuinely
reduce corruption.
One will note that moderate improvement occurred in the CPI index for the
second half of the measurements, 2001-2006, under the Fox administration. PAN’s Fox
enjoyed an average rating of3.55 points, compared to PRI’s Zedillo whose average
corruption rating was 3.19. However,the higher levels of confidence in reduced
corruption have dwindled as Fox’s tenure continues. It dropped 0.4 points from the start
of his presidency to his last year in office, indicating a decline in the public’s perception
of Fox’s ability to reduce or eliminate corruption. According to Consulta Mitofsky s
evaluation of Fox’s presidency, less than 30% of those surveyed thought Fox had done
enough to reduce corruption (Consulta Mitofsky, 2006b).
The range of Mexico’s CPI is from 2.66 in 1997 to 3.7 in 2001. The low rating in
1997 also has the largest amount of variance, perhaps in part accounting for such a low
score that year. The variance in 1997 suggests that the actual CPI could be as high as
3.86, in which case that year would have been the highest recorded CPI in Mexico s
history. The variance for 1996’s CPI rating is also among the highest, indicating that the
actual CPI could have been slightly lower, making the difference between 1996 and 1997
not as large. The highest rating Mexico has received thus far in the CPI scale is 3.7. As
discussed previously, this score in 2001 is likely connected to the high expectations of
Fox as he entered office (officially beginning his term in December of 2000). Even at its
highest rating though, a 3.7 is not an impressive score in the overall estimation of
corruption. The average CPI for Mexico over 12 years is 3.37, well below the 5 point
mark, the midway level between an extremely clean and extremely corrupt nation. A
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score of3 is considered “rampant” corruption, and Mexico comes uncomfortably close to
this mark(CPI 2006). Mexico’s average CPI of3.37 is remarkably similar to its closing
score of 3.3 in 2006. This proves that despite ample time to make improvements in
corruption, the Mexican government has not enacted comprehensive and effective
measures to reduce corruption. Its lack ofcommitment to combat the problem of
corruption results in lower voter turnout: a highly corrupt government will pursue its

own

agenda regardless of the legality of its methods, and is unlikely to be greatly mfluenced
by the opinions ofthe populace, expressed through voting.
Mexico’s CPI rating of3.18 in the first year ofthe study ranks Mexico among the
more corrupt countries. Mexico’s rating hardly improves over time, to a rating of3.3 in
2006. Mexico’s country rank seems to improve over time; it appears at first glance that a
rank of70 out of 163(Mexico in 2006)is better than being number 32 out of41 countries
(Mexico in 1995). However,the overall country rank is misleading. More coimtries are
added to the CPI study over time, particularly as TI acquires harder-to-access mformation
in more remote and secretive states. If in 2006 Mexico is compared to the 41 states used
in the original CPI assessment of 1995, Mexico would rank 37 out of41 countries in
2006, thus falling behind six places in 12 years.(See Appendix for full comparative
chart.) This indicates that other countries, such as Thailand, Brazil, and China, are
reducing corruption at a faster rate than Mexico, which has only improved a marginal
0.12 points overall in just over a decade.
CPI does not simply look at corruption from a governmental standpoint, which up
to now has been the focus of discussion. Institutionally, corruption has a varying impact
depending on what sector of society is in question. Chart 3.2 illustrates the corruption
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rating of various sectors or institutions within society, based on TI’s Global Corruption
Barometer taken in 2005.

Chart 3.2

2005 Corruption Impact on Different
Sectors Or Institutions
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“There is a widespread perception that the authority vested in institutions that
ought to represent the public interest is, in fact, being abused for private gain,”(GCB
2006). Ofthe top six most corrupt institutions according to Mexicans,four ofthose are
directly involved with the government. Political parties and the police force tie with a
score of4.7 out of5 as Mexico’s most corrupt institutions. Ofthe top three political
parties(PAN,PRI,PRD),none are looked upon favorably by more than half ofthe
population (Mexico 2006 Panel Study 2005). This supports the claim that the political
parties are corrupt, and thus looked upon unfavorably. Mexico has long been known for
its notorious police, which “have become legendary for their corruption”(Reding 2000).
The judiciary ranks third, and is largely seen as an extension ofthe political system. The
Congress is considered the fourth most highly corrupt institution, stemming from the PRI
legacy of corruption but maintaining that infamous reputation even after PRI lost its
majority. Taxes are known to be collected neither systematically nor fairly. It is widely
believed that big business and wealthy individuals may elude their tax payments by
bribes to the appropriate government officials.
Mexico’s average score for the corruptness of each given institution or sector is
consistently higher than the world average, and almost always ranks higher than the Latin
American average score (exceptions being the military—^notably weak in Mexico

and

the educational system). Mexico has a history of weak institutions, and this weakness is
easily exploited by corruption(Rubio 2004), Governmental institutions are meant to act
in the interest ofthe country’s citizens for the betterment ofthe state as a whole; yet,
studies such as the GCB reveal that Mexican citizens do not believe the government is
effectively representing their needs at all. Mexicans’ low levels of confidence in their
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institutions manifests itself in disillusionment, resulting in lower levels of participation by
citizens within their political system.
To test how corruption directly affects voter turnout, Chart 3.3 compares the
percentage of voter turnout with corruption score (based on the Corruption Perceptions
Index). Voter turnout is measured fractionally, with 7.85 out of 10 corresponding to
78.5% turnout in that given year.
Chart 3.3

Comparison of Changes
in VoterTurnout and Corruption
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Source data; IDEA 2006, Transparency International, CPI 1995,2000, 2006.
Note: CPI measurements do not begin until 1995, so the 1995 CPI value is used for comparison with the 1994 election turnout. In all
other years, turnout is compared to the CPI measured in the election year.

Interestingly, there does not seem to be a clear relationship between increased
corruption levels and voter turnout. Though the improvement is scarce, corruption has
gotten slightly better over the past decade. Yet, as discussed in depth previously, voter
turnout continues on its decline. In other words, corruption is modestly improving while
voter turnout is declining, conhary to what one might expect.
Several reasons could explain why CPI and voter turnout do not correlate as
expected. The aspects that CPI uses to measure corruption could be different from the
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factors voters take into consideration prior to making their decision of whether or not to
go to the polls. CPI is not specifically a measure of pohtical corruption, but corruption
overall. Hypothetically, if corruption in the business world fell significantly in a period
(such as would result from stricter regulations, more investigations into dishonest
business practices, etc), but political corruption rose dramatically, these two situations
would be averaged to produce a score which reflects corruption overall. The resulting
score could well be consistent with other years, but would not accurately show how
political corruption specifically is perceived. For instance, between 2004 and 2005,
respondents to the GCB indicated that they thought political parties, the police, the
judiciary, and the legislature (the top 4 most highly corrupt institutions, according to
survey respondents) had all gotten more corrupt over the past year(GCB 2004, 2005).
Perhaps if a CPI were developed which specifically assessed the political corruption in a
country, the graph might more accurately represent the link between voter turnout and
corruption.
CPI and voter turnout may yield the expected correlation, if given adequate time.
Chart 3.3 is measured over 12 years, encompassing the past 3 presidential elections and
all of the years in which the CPI was calculated. More data in future years will certainly
yield more information to analyze and explore.
Future studies could examine if CPI has to not only improve (indicating that
corruption has gone down), but improve by a certain amount to have a positive affect on
voter turnout. Perhaps voter turnout does not increase with minor improvements in CPI
score, but once a certain threshold is met,improvement in CPI translates into increased
voter turnout rates. For instance, if corruption levels must be reduced—and the CPI score
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thus increased—^by an entire point in order to have a positive impact on voter turnout, we
would not see this relationship in Mexico because ofthe relatively little progress in
reducing corruption as shown through its CPI scores over the past 12 years.
The link between corruption and voter turnout is more evident in other ways. As
corruption continues to be a major problem in Mexico, voter turnout declines. When
corruption becomes so widespread that the populace readily associates corruption with its
government(as Mexicans do), the negative repercussions are going to come out in
political action (or inaction). Voting is one ofthe few ways citizens are able to protest
their government’s performance. In Mexico, the common mentality is that the
government regularly employs corrupt practices in performing its duties. As long

as

corruption is so abundant, people will not have faith in their government to be effective at
allocating resources or miming the country. With abundant corruption, people lose faith
in their government’s ability to act honestly and transparently. If the voting results will
be altered, or bills pass through the legislature as a result of behind-closed-door-deals, the
government’s credibility is tainted. This author speculates that one way Mexicans are
able to protest the corruption which has become so inherent in their government is to
abstain from voting. They refuse to support a system which fosters such immoral
practices, and therefore choose not to vote in elections which legitimize that system.
The current state of voter turnout in Mexico is bleak. Looking towards the future,
what will voter turnout look like? Will the political situation get better in Mexico, and
corruption be reduced? Mexicans don’t seem to think so. According to survey data,
corruption, which erodes the relationship between citizens and the government, appears
to be a problem which will persist indefinitely unless dramatic changes are made. Below
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is a chart indicating whether Mexicans believe corruption in their country will increase in
the next three years. The world average expectation ofincreasing corruption is also
included for comparison purposes.
Chart 3.4
How Much Will Corruption Increase/
Has Corruption Increased?
Measured in percentage ofrespondents
Mexico World
Expectation That Corruption Will Increase
in the Next Three Years
2003
47.6
42.1
2004
45
63
2005
44
50
Perception That Past Corruption Has
Increased Over the Past Three Years
2005

59

57

Source data: GCB 2003,2004,2005. Percentages are calculated based upon responses to survey data where respondents agreed with
statements that corruption would increase a lot or a little in the next three years.

The severe ratings which Mexicans assigned to different institutions(Chart 3.2)
indicates that they perceive the levels of corruption to be high in their country already.
Chart 3.4 above gives troubling evidence that Mexico’s prospects, according to those
surveyed, are even gloomier than the present. Though the expectations ofcorruption are
lower in 2005 than in 2004, there is a disturbing pattern among approximately halfthe
population who believe corruption will get worse over the next three years. This
evidence is bolstered by impressions of past corruption (measured only in the 2005
GCB), which confirm that corruption in Mexico is getting worse instead of better. It is
likely that voter turnout will continue to decline as corruption is perceived to get worse.
Without notable decreases in negative opinions regarding the presence ofcorruption in
Mexico, voters will continue to be disillusioned with their government and decline to
vote.
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Mexico is confronted with many societal problems,including poverty, insecurity.
and economic troubles. Corruption exists in the context ofthese other problems which
Mexico faces. Chart 3.5 below compares three survey groups which rank the greatest
problems facing Mexico in descending order. This chart indicates that corruption
consistently ranks among the top five most important or severe problems in Mexico.
Chart 3.5
Top Problems Facing Mexico
A Comparison of3 Survey Groups
Listed in Descending Order Beginning with the Greatest Problem

Transparency Intemarionaf

Consulta Mitofsky^

Mexico Survey Panel^

Poverty
Insecurity/Crime/ Violence/Terrorism
Unemployment
Grand or political corraption
_
Environmental problems
Petty or administrative corruption
High prices/inflation
Human rights violations

Insecurity/ Delinquency
Unemployment
Poverty
Econqnuc Crisis
Cormption

Public Insecurity
Unemployment
Poverty
The Economy
Corruption
Social problems
Natural disasters
Political problems
Lack ofgood governance

‘ Transparency International. 2004. Global Corruption Barometer. Respondents ranked the severity of the problem on a 0-4 scale,
listing as many problems as they felt were applicable.
Consulta Mitofsky. 2006. Encuesta: Evaluacion final de gobiemo: Presidente Vicente Fox. Respondents chose the problem they
felt was the biggest problem facing Mexico out of list ofchoices.
Mexico 2006 Panel Study. 2005. Respondents chose a problem they felt was the most important for Mexico in the present day.
This came from the first of four rounds ofsurveys done by the Mexico Panel Study for the 2 July 2006 Presidential Elections. This
list includes only the problems which received one percentage point or higher.

By not eliminating the corruption which is prevalent in Mexico, the country faces
obstacles in overcoming other problems which are directly affected by corruption.
Corruption prevents both “economic growth and sustainable development” which are
necessary factors for the elimination of poverty(CPI 2005). The impoverished masses
are unable to advance themselves economically in a corrupt environment because those
with control of the resources used corrupt means to get to and stay in their advantageous
position. The poor are unable to break out of the poverty cycle because of persistent
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corruption. “Corruption is a major cause ofpoverty as v^ell as a barrier to overcoming it”
(CPI 2005). High voter turnout is among many casualties ofcorruption.
Corruption can be combated by promoting transparency and anti-corruption
efforts in general(CPI 2005). Corruption must be drastically reduced in Mexico in order
for the political system to regain legitimacy among the people. Currently, corruption
prevents the government from acting in concert with the needs ofits people, thereby
creating a gap between the people and their government. “Political corruption poses a
serious threat to the stability of developing democracies by eroding the links between
citizens and governments”(Canache and Allison 2005,91). While the government
remains corrupt, citizens cannot trust in it and may not wish to support it. One ofthe
most basic ways to express dissatisfaction with one’s government is to not vote, and that
is the emerging pattern in Mexico.
The presence ofcorruption threatens the democratic stability of Mexico,because
it undermines fundamental principles upon which democracies are founded. Voting is a
vital democratic practice, and factors which hinder voter turnout should be reduced or
eliminated. Corruption proves to be a factor which does not promote democracy, and
therefore it should be eradicated to ensure continued democratic stability. Corruption
undoubtedly contributes to disillusionment among the population, which increasingly
indicates that it does not trust its government’s authority because ofits unethical and
illegal practices at the national level. Corruption then decreases the opportumties for
democracy to fimction efficiently, and one ofthose democratic practices which suffers is
voter turnout. Lower voter turnout indicates disapproval ofthe government, and the
sustainability ofthat governmental structure could be at risk. In order to ensure sustained
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democracy in Mexico, participation in elections must be high. Greater electoral
participation is achieved through reduced cormption in the country, to eliminate one of
the greatest hindrances to government transparency and integrity.
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Chapter 4: Mexican Government Inefficiency Leads to Decreased Voter Turnout
What kind of president can overturn seven decades of hegemonic mle—^running
on the campaign slogan of“change

●and then be called a lame duck only halfway

through his presidency? What sort of democratic government features elected officials
that are virtually unaccountable to the people who elected them?
The problem of declining voter turnout in Mexico cannot be studied without a
discussion of the context in which the Mexican government functions. Voting is a direct
reflection of citizens’ opinions towards their government, and therefore the role ofthe
government is a crucial consideration in making one’s decision of who to vote for and,
more importantly, whether or not to vote at all. The performance ofthe government
plays a direct role in determining voter participation. When the government is efficient
and transparent, the people see how the government is actively working to make its
citizens’ lives better. However,if the government is corrupt, inefficient, and slow to
adapt to change, voter turnout will be negatively impacted. The latter is the case m
Mexico: the government is viewed as an archaic institution, which is so set in its ways
that it cannot change under new administrations or even under different party leadership.
The Mexican government’s inability to progress at a substantial enough rate has adverse
effects voter turnout, because regardless of what voters choose, the government will
continue to function as it has for decades.
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That is not to say that no progress has been made in the government or in the
election environment which shapes the government’s personnel composition, there just
has not been enough progress. PRI’s style ofrunning the government did not drastically
change from one administration to another. Once PAN won the presidency, it had a
lackluster performance after unrealistically high expectations about PAN’s ability to
profoundly change the government structure for the better. At one time,PRI led an
extremely efficient government because it did not have the constraints ofthe democratic
debate process. In recent years, however, both PRI and PAN have fallen prey to the
lengthy process required oftruly democratic governments, and overall government
efficiency has gone down. It takes a longer amoimt oftime to pass a given number of
bills, and government change is slow in coming. To the average citizen, it appears that
the government is actually becoming less efficient in its transition to democracy(which is
true). In a technological and capitalistic society, efficiency is key; the Mexican
government does not act efficiently when it takes longer now to perform the same tasks it
has done for decades.
Citizens themselves wanted democracy, but did not realize the cost at which that
would come. A genuine environment of democratic debate results in lengthier periods to
discuss legislation. Yet, to those not familiar with the transformation of the Mexican
government to a fully fimctioning democracy,the government appears to be less
competent to do its job, despite reforms and changes within the government structure.
Neither PRI nor PAN has reversed growing government inefficiency, which shows the
populace that the government is not as effective as it ought to be in doing its job. This
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results in a decline in voter turnout, as people believe that regardless of what party they
elect into office, few real and lasting changes will be made.
The Mexican government has long been criticized for its quasi-authoritanan
system, but rates of voter turnout in the 1960s and 1970s were consistently higher than
they are today. Though scholars around the world labeled the election of Vicente Fox
Quesada in 2000 the culmination of Mexico’s transition to a democratic system, only six
years later the flaws of Mexico’s federal system are more obvious than ever, and voter
turnout is at record lows. The government is not running more efficiently than before; if
anything, it is actually less effective at passing legislation now that the PAN political
party is in power, and is not living up to the countless promises publicized during Fox’s
campaign. The lack of real and lasting change at the governmental level is echoed in the
lives ofthe Mexican people. With a government that lacks the ability to pass meaningful
legislation that will positively impact their lives, the Mexican people have little reason to
support their government and its historically corrupt ways by showing up to the polls.
Instead offervor for electing officials into government, disillusionment has taken hold of
the Mexican people and exhibits itself in a decline of voter participation.
For this analysis, I will focus primarily on the Fox administration’s general failure
to achieve “Cambio,” or change, its first and foremost goal prior to assuming the
presidency. I will also explore the legislative deadlock which ensued under Fox, and its
negative consequences for public opinion. I will also use opinion surveys to support the
ideas of decreasing governmental approval and the subsequent growing disenchantment
with the government among the population. I will briefly identify other federal
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institutional contributors to voter disillusionment, including a general lack offaith in the
judiciary branch and a distrust ofthe integrity of the Federal Electoral Institute.
It is largely undisputed that the population’s high expectations ofFox have been
largely unfulfilled (Rubio 2004). But government inefficiency did not start with the Fox
administration. Indeed, it has been a recurring theme in Mexican governance for
decades. This is evidenced, among other ways,in the large bureaucracy which comprises
the federal government itself, or the “vast labour force employed in the government
bureaucracy”(Rowland and Gordon 1996). Mexico employs huge numbers of people in
its government, and yet these employees do not seem to improve the overall efficiency of
the government. Not only are 14% of all workers employed by the state, but between
16,000 and 18,000 employees change positions or become unemployed with each
changing president(Fem^dez-Kelly and Rivero 2003; Story 1986). “Each change of
administration is marked by a massive turnover of personnel within the government at the
national and state levels, echoed at the mimicipeil level every three years” (Grindle
1977).
Though it is characteristic of a democracy to initiate a change in personnel from
one partisan administration to the next, the massive extent ofthe governmental
reshuffling of positions has negative consequences for Mexico. A new employee has
pressure to learn his/her new job quickly, perhaps without any sort of transitioning, to
prove his/her merit before a new administration commences a fresh wave of‘cleaning
house.’ The method ofchoosing who gets a better position and who is demoted in

a new

administration is largely determined by one’s place in a patron-client relationship, a
system known in Mexico as clientalismo. This system is based upon who you know (and
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much less about what you know), whereby a person’s next position is determined by
his/her personal relationships to other players in the system. These people may have little
or no training for their new positions, but by supporting the clientalismo system they
have a chance to move from their former place to virtually any otherjob in the
government(Grindle 1977). The lack oftraining logically leads to wasted time in office,
as a person must take time to learn the nature ofthe new job. Furthermore, with a new
person in charge of a given unit every six years, there is little incentive to think long
term, and instead many put focus on short term goals that would reflect on themselves as
leaders in a positive way (Grindle 1977). Fox continued the extensive bureaucracy
created by the PRI during his sexenio, nurturing this largely inefficient system and by
extension continuing government wastefulness in this regard.
Fox not only failed to live up to expectations in terms of consolidating the
government structure. The disappointment surrounding his recent administration is so
great that his term has been coined “the lost sexenio*" because ofsuch a deficient
administration (Pastor and Wise 2005). Fox ran on a platform promising full and
comprehensive “Change”(“Cambio”), and more than half(53.4%)ofthose who voted
for Fox in 2000 signaled ‘change’ as their principal motivation to support him (Klesner
2005). Fox promised significant improvement in economic growth, employment, poverty
reduction, and social stability. But before his term had even come to a close. Fox became
known as a lame duck president. This undoubtedly bred skepticism among the
population about whether electing a new president in 2006(a competitive election, but
one with considerably less excitement than Fox’s 2000 election) would yield any sort of
change, after the disappointment ofFox’s performance. What accounts for such a drastic
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difference between what Fox promised to accomplish and what he actually achieved?
What are the long term effects ofthis on electoral participation as a whole?
Fox had impossibly high expectations for his success going into his presidency. It
is not surprising that he did not achieve everyone’s standard ofsuccess. What is so
striking about his performance, however,is that he did not even meet his own goals for
himself as president. He promised an ambitious 7% growth rate in GDP annually over all
six years as president. He also pledged to create over one million jobs in each year of his
sexenio. To date, GDP annual growth has yet to reach the 7% benchmark in any one
year, though it was 7% in 2000 when Fox entered his office(The World Bank Group
2006a). According to the WDI for Mexico, growth reached its highest in 2004 with 4%
GDP growth, falling nominally to 3% in 2005 (the most recent data year available)(The
World Bank Group 2006a). Pastor and Wise contribute this growth less to Fox’s
economic changes and more to rising energy prices(Pastor and Wise 2005). Average
annual growth across his sexenio was 2%(Selley 2006). Unemployment remained steady
at about 3%,with no appreciable growth or reduction during the Fox administration
(WDI 2006). Overall the Fox administration oversaw the addition of 1,039,936 formal
jobs to the economy over six years; the total number ofjobs added during the entire
sexenio equaled what Fox promised to add in just one year (Selley 2006). Additionally,
the Mexican Social Security Institute only considers 24% ofthose new jobs to be
permanent(Selley 2006). The economic slowdown in Mexico, especially after several
years of high economic growth under President Zedillo, can be attributed in part to the
worldwide economic slowdown which occurred after the events of September 11, 2001,
in the United States. But the lack of promised GDP growth, and the vast overestimation
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ofthe number offormaljobs it would add, contributed to the dissatisfaction over Fox’s
term as president. The effects ofthe economic situation on the individual citizen are
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
Why couldn’t Fox live up to his promises of growth? The lower-than-promised
growth is at least in part due to Fox’s inability to make his desired economic changes.
Fox may have had good ideas for economic reform, but he could not put them into action
because of Congressional blocks. This idea leads to a discussion ofthe changing role of
the Mexican president in the past decade.
Fox’s watershed victory in the 2000 elections marked the inaugural admimstration
by the conservative PAN party, the first party other than the PRI to run Mexican affairs in
over seven decades. He quickly realized the power of the presidency is notably reduced
when the president’s party does not hold the majority of seats in Congress. Before, the
Mexican president was an all-powerful figure. With a loyal PRI majority in Congress,
the PRI presidents could safely assume that their agendas would be approved with little
controversy. The election of a president from a party other than PRI, however, brought to
light the institutional weaknesses ofthe president’s position. “The Mexican executive
was basically exposed as an emperor with no clothes” as it became apparent that the
president’s actual ability to exercise great political power was inflated (Pastor and Wise
2005, 142). The great prestige ofthe power of Mexico’s chief executive greatly
diminished as it became clear that the Mexican system had been created to foster a
system in which the president and the Congressional majority were ofthe same political
party. When Fox broke that tradition in 2000, he found pursuing his agenda much more
difficult than his predecessors.
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After three years as president. Fox still had not gotten passage for any of his
major bills(excepting the budget and some minor, non-controversial bills) through
Congress(Rubio 2004). For presidential-sponsored bills introduced to the Chamber of
Deputies(the lower house of Congress) between 2000 and 2002,Fox had just below an
86% success rate at getting his bills approved (Pastor and Wise 2005). Eighty-six percent
appears to be a high rate in comparison to other countries; in a study looking at minority
governments, congresses only approved an average of61% of executive-sponsored bills
(Pastor and Wise 2005). However,compared to a 97.3% success rate ofPRI executives
to push through their agendas. Fox’s success is markedly lower in the Mexican context
(Pastor and Wise 2005). Therefore, to average observers within Mexico, it would appear
that Fox is not getting things done as well as his predecessors. It is then reasonable to
assume that these people blame Fox for not being able to pass his agenda through
Congress, and they consequently lose faith in Fox’s administration as a catalyst for
positive change. Therefore, voters are less convinced that their government has the
ability to improve itself, and they may become disenchanted with the government to the
point where they withdraw from electoral participation completely.
Fox’s inefficiency was obvious to voters, as the results ofthe 2003 midterm
elections showed, granting PRI a substantial gain in congressional seats and marking a
serious loss ofPAN power. PAN lost 25% of its Congressional seats in 2003(compared
to 2000), allowing PRI the greatest percentage ofrepresentation in both houses of
Congress for both of Fox’s legislative terms(3 years each in Mexico).
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Chart 4.1

A Comparison of PAN/PRI Representation in
Congress 2000-2006
1

House of Deputies seat distribution(Lower House)
2000
2003
PAN
209(41.8%)
151 (30.2%)
PRI
211 (42.2%)*
224 (44.8%)*
u
Senate seat distribution (Upper House)
2000
PAN
48(37.5%)
PRI
60(46.8%)*
'Majorities are marked with an asterick*
^ Senate elections are every 6 years, while House elections are every 3 years
Source: Crespo,Jose Antonio. 2003.

In 2003, the fhistration towards Fox and PAN grew as it became evident that Fox
had thus far failed to follow through with his promise ofchange. PRI capitalized on the
people’s dissatisfaction with Fox to increase its numbers in the House of Deputies, to just
under 45% of the total seats. Thus, despite losing the presidency,PRI is the most
influential party in Congress during the second half ofFox’s term. “Even as an
opposition party, the PRI has a much stronger presence than the PAN does as a new
ruling party”(Crespo 2003, 10). Despite its loss ofthe presidency in 2000,PRI showed
itself as a force to be reckoned with in its 2003 Congressional electoral performance. PRI
gained a plurality in the Senate(Mexico’s Upper House) with 60 seats.
It is not the number of seats in Congress alone that determines whether a president
can push tlirough desired legislation. The idea of legislative cooperation, a foreign idea
to Mexico in 2000 because of its relative unimportance previously, became a central
focus under Fox. A stalemate characterized much of the Congressional record under Fox,
as Congress adjusted to its newfound role of being a major player in shaping law. Since
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PRI’s establishment in 1929, there had been no need to foster bipartisan agreement in
Congress because PRI continually held the vast majority of Congressional seats. After
PRI lost its control of Congress in 1997, however, the nature ofthe Legislature changed.
Congress became less of a rubber stamp for the president’s agenda and more of a
legislative check on the president’s power.
A major flaw ofPresident Fox lies in that he did not promote enough multi-party
legislative cooperation while in office (Pastor and Wise 2005). He did not work to
encourage Congress to unite in passing legislation, and as a result the various parties had
little motivation to work together. The Congress is plagued by a stalemate between
parties who lack any real enticement to work together to produce meaningful legislation.
Mexico needs to “break the incentives for gridlock that have pervaded the system over
the last decade”(Estrada and Poire 2007, 86). In other words, Mexico needs to establish
a pattern of cooperation between parties, rather than foster competition between them, m
order to for Congress as a whole to be more successful in the future.
Mexican citizens’ attitudes regarding bipartisan government, the role of
legislatures, and executive-legislative cooperation has changed during the Fox
administration. According to a survey done by Nexos,75% of those surveyed in July
2000(the same month as President Fox’s election) responded that a divided government
would make Mexico better off; in July 2003, only 48% agreed with such a statement
(Crespo 2003). It took seeing it in action for Mexicans to realize how different a divided
government would be compared to their memory ofPRI hegemonic government. Passing
laws in an environment which necessitates negotiation and compromise became a major
obstacle in a country that has long neglected the nurturing of these qualities. Regarding
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the role of Deputies(members ofthe Lower House), in August 2002,56% favored
cooperation between the President and Deputies; that number rose to 65% by August
2003(Crespo 2003). Oppositely, though not as large a difference statistically, those who
wanted the Deputies to serve as a counterweight to the President—^to balance out
executive power with legislative checks—decreased slightly from 29% to 26% in the
same time period (Crespo 2003). These statistics indicate that people desire greater
harmony between these two divisions of government, creating a place where groups with
different objectives can be compatible. More people wanted cooperation between the
branches of government once they saw that a divided government and a truly democratic
structure make for a lengthy legislative process.
Prior to Fox’s election, the majority of people wanted greater checks and balances
on presidential power, and one way to do so was through greater Congressional power.
Unfortunately, they seem to have gotten what they wanted, but too far to the other
extreme. Compared to the efficiency of past PRI administrations. Fox’s divided
government appeared to be a regression rather than a step towards progress. “It became
clear that the old rules were no longer adequate in the new context ofcongressional
plurality”(Crespo 2003, 13). With a deadlocked Congress and considerably weakened
president, the citizens shifted their preference to an environment ofcompromise,rather
than one of executive mandate and Congressional power struggle. A survey by El
Universal^ a national newspaper, asked people in September and December of2003 and
found greater support among the populace for increased negotiation between the
legislative and executive branches. In September,42% of those surveyed thought
Congress worked hard enough to “seek agreement,” but in December that percentage
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dropped to a mere 23%(Crespo 2003). A full 47% perceived that the various parties in
Congress obstruct each others’ agendas, preventing the passage oflegislation sponsored
by one party simply to keep the party from achieving anything(Crespo 2003). Thwarting
opposition parties’ agendas does not make for a more efficient government, and that fact
is becoming continually more evident to the population, as demonstrated through survey
data and in poll turnout. At the end ofFox’s term, a slight majority of55% ofthose
surveyed approved of the relationship between Fox and the Senators/Deputies(Consulta
Mitofsky 2006b). The results of these surveys indicate trepidation over how well Fox
and the Congress are perceived to get along. The incoming president, Felipe Calderon,
must learn to negotiate with Congress, as PAN does not have a majority in either house
(neither does any other party, incidentally). Future presidents will likely face similar
problems in reshaping the executive-legislative relationship. It is essential that the chief
executive and the Legislature find a way to work with each other to ensure that voters see
government initiative to be resourceful. Otherwise, voters will likely grow continually
more disillusioned with their government if it is not seen as competent and if it
consistently fails to deliver real and lasting change to the people on a personal level.
Voters have little motivation to support a government which does not run efficiently, and
therefore government inefficiency makes voters less likely to participate in elections,
resulting in declining voter turnout.
Problems with the Fox administration do not stop with inefficiency at the
legislative or economic levels. Social problems such as indigenous discrimination or
extreme poverty mobilize some people to pursue other action outside political
participation. Among these threats to political stability are the Zapatistas, a leftist
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revolutionary group which broke onto the international scene when it revolted against the
Mexican government on January 1, 1994, the day NAFTA went into effect The rest of
the 1990s did not produce any longterm solutions to appease the Zapatista’s concerns,
and the group still operates in the southernmost state of Chiapas today. Quoting jfrom the
Zapatistas’ unofficial spokesperson,“The problem of war is not a problem of who has
more guns, more men or more bullets; it is a problem of who is right,”(LaBotz 1995).
Prior to the 2000 elections. Fox claimed he could solve the Zapatista conflict in
15 minutes as president. After six years as president, however, the problem remains
unresolved, to say the least. Recent social problems which plagued Fox as president
include the Oaxaca teachers’ strike which lasted most of2006,several mining accidents
(most notably in January 2006), and persistent organized drug and gang crime. These
unresolved cases of social unrest undoubtedly contributed to overall disillusionment
among the populace. In this instance, the disillusionment can most easily be categorized
as dissatisfaction with Fox and his inability to rid Mexico ofthese social ills that continue
to plague the country and its citizens.
Due to Fox’s failure in multiple arenas, fewer people believe Mexico is on the
right course. Early in his term (February 2001),44.7% of people stated that Mexico was
on the right course, in comparison to 35.3% who felt Mexico was not(Consulta Mitofsky
2006a). In August 2006, one month after the highly contested July elections, 54.8% of
people responded that Mexico was headed in the wrong direction, while only 35.7% felt
Mexico remained on the right track (Consulta Mitofsky 2006a). Regarding the 2006
elections themselves,45.3% surveyed disapproved ofFox’s handling of the elections, a
greater percentage than those who approved of his job (Consulta Mitofsky 2006a). Part
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ofthe anger towards Fox’s involvement in the 2006 elections is the belief that he openly
supported the PAN candidate, Felipe Calderon, in his presidential campaign. It is illegal
for a sitting president to support another presidential candidate, and the indiscretion
exercised by Fox in his choice to openly help Calderon campaign angered many
Mexicans. Compared to his presidential predecessor. Fox used less personal discretion
than Zedillo (Estrada and Poire 2007).
The growing disapproval of Fox’s performance is evident in other ways. Fox
lacks a defining piece of legislation to redeem multiple years ofless-than-impressive
governing. Fox cannot take credit for any defining legislation, such as Carlos Salinas and
NAFTA. Hopes were high that Fox’s close relationship with U.S. President George W.
Bush would yield much needed immigration reform, but if anything immigration
legislation in the U.S. has been disadvantageous for Mexico. In terms of how much Fox
achieved as president, 56.6% ofthose surveyed in November 2006 said they tliought Fox
achieved less than they expected (Consulta Mitofsky 2006b). The same survey also
revealed that in relation to his campaign promises made back in 2000,65.1% responded
that he completed few or none of his promised commitments by the end of his term
(Consulta Mitofsky 2006b). Regardless of what progress Fox could have carried out in
the last months of his tenure, the majority of Mexicans would have considered him to
have fallen short of their expectations for him. “Nothing Fox accomplishes will ever be
perceived as being close to what he has promised”(Rubio 2004, 17). Ofthose groups of
people that he did help, survey data reveals perceived favoritism by Fox to help certain
sections of society. Often categories of people, a majority ofrespondents felt Fox helped
only business persons and students enough, while women, elderly, the poor, and
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indigenous people among other groups, were not sufficiently supported by the Fox
government and its agenda(Consulta Mitofsky 2006b). Fox received strong support
from businessmen and younger, more educated people in his election campaign,so it is
not surprising that these groups of people benefited from his presidency. Unfortunately,
so many of the other categories of disadvantaged or marginalized citizens did not
substantially benefit from his term in power, and this could contribute to the overall
disapproval of his tenure.
Fox’s poor presidential performance is one ofthe most easily recognizable factors
contributing to government inefficiency as understood by the population, but it is not the
only one. A lack of accountability and decreased confidence in government institutions
also play a role in discrediting the government. Accountability, or being held responsible
for one’s actions, is important in a democracy because it mandates transparency and
efficiency in government. In the realm of politics, accountability ensures elected officials
are answerable to their constituents. In voting for legislation or supporting certain
positions, accountability provides motivation for elected officers to act in the best interest
of the people they represent, rather than pursue their own agenda. Mexico faces a
genuine crisis in elected official accountability, partially due to the prohibition of
reelection. In Mexico, the Constitution mandates that no elected official may run for
consecutive terms in office, and few may run another term for the same position ever(the
president, for instance, may never run for president again). The origin of such a
provision stems from the abuse of power exercised by Mexican politicians (particularly
Porfirio Diaz)before the Mexican Revolution. By prohibiting reelection, Mexico ensures
it will not repeat a period of dictatorship. However, as a result of not allowing reelection.
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elected persons only have to appeal to the people during campaign periods or before they
are in office, but not once they are elected. Lawmakers,for instance, since they cannot
be reelected, are not held accoimtable for their actions or policy choices(McCann and
Lawson 2003). Therefore, once a person is elected into office, he/she no longer must
answer to his/her constituents in hopes of being reelected; instead, one is firee to pursue a
personal agenda or allow individual beliefs to dictate legislative behavior, rather than act
in the best interest of the public at large or be a voice ofconstituent opinion. As people
have less of a say in what goes in governmental affairs and are unlikely to impact their
representative’s voting behavior, they feel generally disconnected jfrom their
representative’s decision making process(Rubio 2004).
With little accountability from their representatives and the realization that their
president has not lived up their expectations, citizens hardly have motivation to support a
government that is so far removed from them, the people, and thus have fewer reasons to
vote. Vicente Fox did not deliver on his widely-appealing promises, and elected officials
only court public support during elections and not after. Ifthose that are elected to serve
the people do not do so, it is unlikely that the people will continue to support such a
system through voting. If voting does not make a tangible difference to them personally,
the importance of participating in elections is greatly reduced. With almost no personal
gain fi-om electoral participation, it is reasonable to assume that fewer people will vote.
Since the Fox administration did not change things for the majority of people, voter
turnout in 2006 declined because people did not perceive the government as making
much of an impact in their personal lives.
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Confidence in government institutions remained an issue under Fox. In a survey
where people rated their trust/confidence in an institution,6 of 13 listed institutions were
political, but none were in the top four spots(Campos 2004). Ofthe political institutions,
the top three (in order) were the Federal Electoral Institute(#5), the Supreme Court(#6),
and the President(#7). Because of their confidence rating in comparison to other
institutions, it is important to consider the current status ofthese top three organizations
to see what impact they may have on voter turnout. The disappointments in Fox’s
presidency did little to encourage higher voter turnout, and subsequently turnout went
down in 2006. The judiciary branch, though it has gained significant autonomy in
comparison to the height ofPRI hegemony,is still assumed by many to be an extension
of political power, and thus lacks legitimacy as an autonomous entity. “Many Mexicans
now perceive the Justice system as little but a political tool”(Weiner 2000, 2).
Two aspects of elections are particularly pertinent to increasing voter turnout:
electoral reforms and the Federal Electoral Institute. Certainly many ofthe electoral
reforms in recent years increased confidence in the election process. On some occasions,
however, electoral reforms may have actually made it harder to register as a new party,
something perhaps understood by the people as reducing their political freedom to create
a new party. A new party now must have twice as many members to register and abide
by all 1997 electoral reform rules mandated for new parties(Crespo 2003). Furthermore,
election reforms may actually make it easier to abstain from elections, due to stricter
voter regulations and increased competition among parties(Klesner and Lawson 2001).
Another major issue in the realm of electoral politics is the Federal Electoral
Institute (IFE). Carlos Salinas created IFE to provide a sort of oversight for all future
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elections in Mexico. Although its creation alone has increased the validity ofthe
electoral system, its governing body’s composition raises doubts about its overall
integrity as an authoritative electoral mediator. One president and eight other spots
comprise IFE’s General Council, or top management group. In 2003,the issue arose of
how to appropriate the seats to oversee the next series of elections(including the 2006
Presidential Elections). The PRI wanted to appoint the vacant seats based on the most
recent(2003) electoral performance, which would give it a majority. The breakdown
would be the President of the General Council and three ofits members appointed by
PRI,three chosen by PAN,and two by PRD. Using a method such as this pushes aside
the precedents established in the 1994 and 1996 electoral reforms(mandating impartiality
in the IFE, among other things), but PRI’s increased power after midterm elections gave
it strength to push through such a proposal for the distribution ofseats(Crespo 2003).
Conflict came when the PRI and PRD could not agree on fundamental rules for
determining which people could be put on the Council,so the PRI convinced the PAN to
exclude the PRD from having seats on the General Coimcil altogether. This resulted in a
Council comprised offour PRI representatives plus the President, and four PANappointed members. Though they did follow rules requiring that the Lower House of
Congress(House ofDeputies) approve each of the candidates, this alone did not rectify
the quarrel with PRD. Basically, the PRD had the evidence to challenge the legitimacy
of a close result in the 2006 elections before the election took place, because the top two
political parties purposely excluded the PRI(Crespo 2003). The PRD challenged the
election result, which gave PAN’s Calderdn the victory by less than one percentage point,
where PRD cited IFE’s partiality due to the bias ofthe persons which made up the

51

General Council. Because ofthe manner in which the PRI and PAN excluded the PRD,
“a post-electoral conflict would break out that would be marked by... distrust... similar
to the climate that prevailed during Carlos Salinas de Gortari’s administration and [that]
was thought to have ended after the 1994 and 1996 reforms”(Crespo 2003,6). The 2006
elections proved that, despite sweeping reforms, electoral integrity would continue to be
challenged and questioned for some time.
Conflict is a defining feature of both the elections and the Mexican government
itself. A drastic gap developed between Mexicans’ high expectations ofFox during the
2000 elections and the low output produced by Fox’s administration. The government
has come to be seen by the people as by and large unresourceful, producing little
legislation which has any profound impact on them personally. Because the government
is not acting efficiently, voters have fewer tangible results to refer to in making their
voting decisions. If all the main political parties are strikingly similar, none of which is
able to institute real change at the federal level, voters have little motivation to support
any ofthe parties. Without the belief that government can work effectively enough to
make a difference in their lives, voters are less inclined to support their political system
by participating in it(via voting). Disenchantment with poor government performance
shows itself through declining voter turnout in Mexico.
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Chapter 5: Electoral Fraud and Apathy Erode Voter Turnout
For decades, election fraud was commonplace in Mexico. As the PRI’s complete
control over the political landscape weakened, opposition parties (particularly the PAN)
in turn grew stronger and more competitive. The PRI resorted to fraud to guarantee its
dominance for another few years, but largely had to give up this practice after the fiasco
ofthe 1988 elections. The legacy offraud is still fresh in the minds of many Mexicans,
however, and mere allegations of fraud still have a profound impact on the attitude ofthe
people towards the integrity ofthe electoral system. Though visible fraud has declined
significantly in the past decade, its much reduced presence still poses a genuine threat to
democratic legitimacy. Electoral fraud is one of multiple contributors to growing
disillusionment among the population because people cannot trust election results to be
legitimate. A general lack ofinterest in politics along with various scandalous events
also discredit the electoral process for Mexicans.
Mexico features a long history of electoral fraud at all levels of government. In
the past, fraud generally centered around maintaining the PRI’s hegemony of political
power. The PRI used bribes, particularly in rural areas, to buy people’s votes. In rural
areas, where the poor are more dependent on governmental aid (such as fertilizer or food
subsidies), the PRI proved particularly effective. The PRI developed a “reputation for
electoral fraud” in these rural parts of Mexico(Brophy-Baermann 1994, 126).
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Over time the PRI became more creative with its fraudulent tactics. '‘Pregnanf
ballot boxes are boxes filled with pre-marked ballots which arrive after the polls—or
Casillas—^have closed to replace the box with the real ballots. The ‘toco’ method
involved stuffing other, pre-marked ballots inside ofone’s own ballot and inserting all of
them into the ballot box. LaBotz cites the colorful language developed by Mexicans to
describe the events of election day, such as the PRI mapuches(raccoons)riding the
^carruseP (merry-go-round)to various voting places, voting in multiple casillas(1995).
Sometimes PRI party bosses would move the location ofthe polling place on the day of
the election to prevent unwelcome voters from participating. On other occasions, the
total votes for PRI exceeded the total number of registered voters in the voting district
(Klesner 2005). A political boss might gather up peasants, take them to the casillas.
mark their ballots for them, and then put the ballot in the box without the physical
participation ofthe voter at all(LaBotz 1995). PRI also resorted to violent and/or
coercive methods to ensure both voter turnout and proper candidate support. Physical
violence, removal from their land, orjob loss were all possible repercussions for people
who did not go along with the PRI(LaBotz 1995).
Vote tampering certainly occurred in and around the casillas, but perhaps the
greater voting fraud carried out by the PRI took place at an institutional level. In 1985 in
Nuevo Leon and in 1986 in Chihuahua, the PAN challenger is widely believed to have
won, but the PRI initiated fraud to change the election results(Wiarda and Guajardo
1988; Szymanski 2001).
Given this expansive variety of tactics, it is no wonder the PRI maintained its hold
on power for so long. Many of these problems have been remedied since the 1990s,
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including a massive distribution of authentic identification voting cards(mandatory in
order to vote), updated voter registration lists, and geographically dispersed precincts.
However,the system is still far firom perfect. Each ofthe 95,000 precincts is to have only
300 ballots, but in 2006 multiple Mexico City casillas reported running out of ballots,
due to having more than 300 registered voters assigned to that precinct. This prevented a
number of people from voting at all in the elections. Other people who claimed they
should have been registered were not. On the other extreme,some registration lists had
the same name and information multiple times(LaBotz).
These instances of fraud and corruption undoubtedly “put the credibility ofthe
electoral process in question for many Mexicans”(BClesner 2005, 117). But no election
fraud is quite as startling as that of the 1988 presidential elections. Despite small-scale
fraud (such as those tactics described above), the PRI still lacked the power to guarantee
presidential victory in the polls. The 50.1% turnout rate published by the government
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considered skeptically, as vote tampering likely skewed the actual voter turnout
percentage. As the early results indicated an electoral upset by challenger Cuauhtemoc
C^denas Solorzano over PRI’s Carlos Salinas de Gortari, then-President Miguel de la
Madrid Hurtado had to make a decision. Should he let PRI’s hegemony of presidential
power slip away and honor the voters’ choice to put a new party in the presidency, or
should he alter the voting results and ensure continued PRI authority and (hopefully)
stability? The night of the 1988 election, the computer system used to count the votes at
the Ministry of Gobemacion (the equivalent to the U.S. Ministry ofthe Interior) crashed,
and when it came back online Salinas was the winner. De la Madrid’s choice to rig the
election is one that would define Mexico for years to come. In his book published in
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1994, de la Madrid said he acted in order to preserve order and stability for the country
by maintaining PRI power(Thompson 2004). This book is the most defining proofofthe
widely publicized fraud. The election ballots themselves could offer definitive evidence
ofthe true winner, but in 1991 Congress ordered all ballots from the controversial
election to be burned.
Election fraud has impacted some ofthe biggest players in Mexican politics
today, such as Vicente Fox in his gubernatorial election in Guanajuato in 1991. In an
election “marred with fraud,” Fox protested the election results and an interim governor
led the state until a new election in 1995(Rubio 2004,15). Fox won outright in this new
election, and the results forced PRI to concede. Two of2006’s presidential candidates.
the PRI’s Roberto Madrazo and the PRD’s Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador(AMLO),first
squared off in the Tabasco gubernatorial race in 1994. Madrazo reportedly spent 60
times the campaign spending limit, buying his victory over Lopez Obrador(Estrada and
Poire 2007). Lopez Obrador launched a series of protests, which led then-President
Ernesto Zedillo to attempt, unsuccessfully, to remove his fellow PRI member Madrazo
from the governor’s post. Madrazo’s political ties and cormpt behavior are believed to
be the reasons that he maintained the governorship. “Madrazo personifies the corrupt
legacy of the authoritarian PRI”(Estrada and Poire 2007, 76). Madrazo’s election as the
PRI candidate for president in 2006 only added to suspicions offoul play at the national
electoral level.
In the 2000 and 2006 elections, critics continue to claim fraud. Vicente Fox’s
“Friends ofFox”(“Amigos de Fox”)fund created a way for Fox to raise money for his
upcoming 2000 presidential election without adhering to the the donation limits
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mandated by IFE. The IFE spending limits prevent big businesses and wealthy
individuals from giving exorbitant amounts of money to a candidate, thus reducing the
influence that these groups might have on the candidate should he/she win. Friends of
Fox was established in 1997—long before the presidential candidates announced their
explicit intention to run for office—as a nonpartisan group of supporters ofFox in his
governorship post(Shirk 2000). Because it did not directly solicit funds under the
direction of the PAN party leadership, it appealed to members of parties outside the PAN,
who then donated as ‘amigos’ of Fox. By gaining a base outside of his political party.
Fox used this fundraising and publicity organization without being confined by IFE’s
regulations, because it was not explicitly a PAN group.
The year 2006 ushered in a unique set ofelectoral scandals. All three ofthe
major candidates faced scandals which threatened their political horizons. These
scandals are significant because oftheir influence on voters. People still lack consistent
respect for the electoral process, and their opinion freely fluctuates with different events
leading up to elections(Carter Center 1994). Exposing another candidate’s flaws or
attracting negative press to an opponent can pay offfor a candidate in the polls. Thus,
negative advertising and smear campaigns are no strangers to the Mexican campaign
scene.
AMLO claimed to be the target ofrepeated smear campaigns in his run for the
presidency. As the mayor of Mexico City, his reputation for getting things done
regardless of the rules or laws culminated in conflict when he pushed through a highway
bill which had previously been struck down by the courts. The PRI and PAN teamed up
in an attempt to bring criminal charges against him, and thus make him ineligible to run
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for president (it is illegal to run for president in Mexico if one has pending criminal
charges; a court case surely would have dragged on imtil after the elections were over).
However, AMLO led a march of nearly a million people in his power base of Mexico
City to protest the charges, and President Fox dismissed the allegations. Several other
public charges of fraud, extortion, or embezzlement by members of high ranking officials
in AMLO’s campaign also served as a hindrance to his campaign.
Calderon’s encounter with political scandal came to light during the June
presidential debates, when AMLO accused Calderon of offering his brother-in-law
special government contracts and unlawful tax breaks while Calderon was Energy
Minister. Madrazo’s reputation for fraud made him an easy target for accusations of
untrustworthiness. Madrazo, as the presidential candidate, was the embodiment ofthe
PRI during the elections. His notorious reputation likely did not help attract new voters
to the PRI. A striking 59% ofrespondents considered Madrazo to be not very or not at
all honest(Mexico Survey Panel 2006). The name Madrazo was so notorious that, part
way through his campaign, Madrazo began calling himself Roberto, instead ofgoing by
his last name, because so many associated his last name with dishonesty. His opponents
waged an effective negative ad campaign, including billboards which said “Do you
believe Madrazo? Me neither!”(Estrada and Poire 2007, 77).
The 2006 elections denote the most closely contested election in modem Mexican
history. After leading the polls for nearly three years before the start ofthe 2006 election
year, AMLO and Calderon locked into a tight race in the months before the elections
(BBC 2006a). Calderon emerged victorious by a mere 240,000 votes, less than 1% of the
vote. Upon the IFE’s announcement of Calderon as the winner, AMLO claimed that the
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PAN rigged the election results in its favor. His claims ofthe fraud committed by the
PAN included stuffing ballot boxes, recording more votes in a casilla than registered
voters for that polling station, and altering votes tabulated in the electoral computers
(BBC 2006b). He also cited Fox’s public campaigning on behalfof Calderon, which IFE
acknowledged. Though IFE definitively concluded that the election results were valid,
AMLO continued his protests for months after the July 2 elections. He even threatened
to set up a parallel government, whose primary pmpose would be to thwart Calderon’s
agenda. AMLO gave up his street protests by the end of2006, but to this day has still not
conceded electoral defeat.
Due at least in part to past electoral fraud,some social activist groups in Mexico
have taken a bold stance against electoral participation. The EZLN (Ejercito Zapatista de
Liberacion Nacional), or the “Zapatistas,” as the group is perhaps more commonly
known, initiated a six-month “Other Campaign,” which encouraged people not to vote in
the 2006 elections. On July 2(Election Day),some 2,500 people participated in the
culminating march to the Zocalo, Mexico City’s historic downtown square, made up of
1

participants who expressed their right not to vote(SourceMex 2006).

The total number

of people who consciously abstained from voting is unknown, but voter turnout proved to
be significantly low in Chiapas,the homestate ofthe EZLN. The southernmost state m
Mexico had voter participation as low as 30% in some municipalities(SourceMex 2006).
Chiapas has one ofthe largest percentages ofindigenous peoples in Mexico, with among
the lowest levels of literacy and the highest levels ofpoverty in the country. These

'This author witnessed both the Other Campaign’s rally on July 2 and AMLO’s march on the Zocalo on
July 8 to protest IFE’s decision to deem Calderon as the legitimate president.
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indicators generally meant support for PRI, whose strongest support base is poor and
uneducated, but in this case the EZLN perhaps found a stronghold.
Despite its explicit encouragement to not vote in the 2006 elections, the Zapatistas
did join with Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador to protest Calderon’s claimed presidential
victory. The EZLN justified their participation in the rallies for AMLO—after they
staunchly refused to endorse a candidate prior to the elections—^not because they now
supported AMLO,but because they validated his accusations offi*aud and demanded a
fair outcome of the elections. EZLN supported the PRD’s claims that five million
registered voters included on electoral lists were ineligible voters(SourceMex 2006).
They claimed three million ofthose people no longer live in Mexico, and the other two
million were deceased (SourceMex 2006). “According to the information we have, the
IFE had about 1.5 million votes in reserve to compensate for any disadvantage for
Calderon,” said EZLN leader Subcomandante Marcos(SourceMex2006). Publicity of
fraud by this group along with other AMLO sympathizers certainly does not contribute to
an increased public sense of electoral validity.
It is essential to increase citizens’ confidence in the electoral process in order for
elections to gain credibility (Carter Center 1994). Quite obviously, confidence is
something that Mexico’s electoral system lacks. In a study done by the conservative,
government-sponsored group the Mexico 2006 Study Panel, confidence in the IFE varied
greatly. Only 25% of respondents claimed they thought highly ofIFE,34% thought of it
somewhat highly, and 37% did not think highly of or had no confidence in IFE at all
(Mexico 2006 Survey Panel 2005). IFE’s credibility faces serious doubt among the
greatest percentage of Mexicans surveyed (37%), especially after the electoral
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controversy following the July 2 elections. The Economist refers to survey data revealing
37% ofrespondents believed jfiraud occurred {Economist 2006).
Fraud in Mexico is not limited to achieving victory over another political party.
In 2007, all five candidates for Party President ofthe PRI claimed fraud ofsome kind or
another, including fraudulent voting credentials(Mexico Solidarity Network 2007a).
Interestingly, more than 25% ofthose PRI members who voted for their party head
abstained from endorsing any ofthe listed candidates. This extremely high rate of
abstention within a political party group itself is significant, in that it shows abstention to
be an affliction not just to those outside the formal political system, but also those with a
history of political participation and a direct benefit from it.
Apathy is one of a handful of negative effects resulting from prolonged electoral
fraud. Apathy, or a general lack ofinterest, manifests itselfin the political opinions of
many Mexicans, resulting in a general lack ofinterest in the political arena. “Mexicans
know of and care little about politics”(McCann and Lawson 2003,62). This seemingly
simple quote has weighty implications. Since many are not aware of politics and/or have
no interest in it, the political system has little to offer them. As disillusionment with the
political system grows(due to electoral fraud, corruption, lack of change in daily life and
government inefficiency), more people remove themselves from political aspects of life
for lack of caring. Growing rates of apathy threaten democracy’s sustainability, which is
built upon extensive participation ofthe population through elections(among other
things). Without that support from the electorate, the government loses legitimacy and
risks volatility. “Apathy presents a potential danger to democracy, and governmental
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instability may result”(DID 2005). Apathy is another way disenchantment is evident in
the Mexican political structure.
In a survey done by the Mexico 2006 Panel Study in October 2005,^ pollsters
asked how closely respondents were following the presidential campaigns. Sixty-seven
percent claimed they rarely or never followed the progress ofthe campaigns, while less
than half ofthat(32% ofrespondents)said they followed closely or a lot(Mexican Panel
Study 2005). In 2006, another highly publicized event competed for the attention ofthe
population: the World Cup Soccer Championship. Soccer is a source ofnational pride
for many Latin American countries, and Mexico proved to be no exception. This author
found it was much easier to strike up a conversation about soccer, or watch soccer on tv.
than it was to talk about politics or watch a presidential debate in public. The Los
Angeles Times confirmed these findings: “Pollsters have confirmed the obvious: At least
two-thirds of Mexico's voters are more attuned to the World Cup than to the contentious,
unpredictable three-man race to succeed President Vicente Fox"(SourceMex 2006:Los
Angeles Times). I learned that people consider the political atmosphere in their country a
lost cause, but soccer offered a venue where Mexicans could hope for positive results. It
quickly became clear to me how important a role soccer played in the lives of Mexicans.
The impact of this international soccer tournament was so great that some scholars claim
“a soccer disappointment could manifest itself in the polls as an aggression against the
‘establishment”’(Source Mex 2006). While I have not found data to support this sort of
statement definitively, it does indicate how much soccer affects national opinion/pride.

^ The Mexico 2006 Panel Study assessed the opinions of2,400 Mexicans about the elections and other
pertinent issues in a study conducted in October 2005. The Panel conducted two other waves of the survey,
in February/March 2006 and July 2006. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2005)
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When not faced with the choice ofthe World Cup or presidential campaigns,the
majority of the population still lacks concern over political matters. Twice as many
respondents claim national politics interests them little or not at all(66%),compared to
33% ofthose who found a lot or some interest in political affairs(Mexican Panel Study
2005). In terms of how often politics comes up in a typical conversation,55% said it
rarely or never came up in their discussions, while 45% said they talked about politics
daily, one a week, or once a month (Mexican Panel Study 2005). When people do not
talk about politics in their spare time, they lose out on a chance to become educated about
political matters. If they are not informed, either by personal conversation or the media,
they are less likely to care about the outcome of an election, and therefore are less likely
to participate.
Mexico’s governmental structure is very similar to that of most democracies. It
has a president that is elected every six years and cannot run for reelection, a Congress
which is to provide checks on executive power and provide legislative agendas, and a
judiciary designed to act independently ofthe other two branches of government. The
problem lies in the way these offices are supposed to function and how they actually
exercise their power. While elections have become more fair in recent years, electoral
fraud still hinders confidence in the electoral system by the Mexican people. Reputable
sources, such as the Carter Center, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and
the World Bank, all hail Mexico as a democracy in transition, with greatly reduced fraud
and legitimate elections. Unfortunately, these institutions do not represent the Mexican
people, whose views in survey data indicate that fraud is far from eradicated in their state.
Accusations of fraud are still a commonplace in the political system, and until that
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concern can be truly eliminated through greater political transparency, fraud will continue
to be an acceptable scapegoat for losing an election. So long as fraud—or even the mere
believable threat of fraud—^remains prevalent in Mexico, it will be difficult to validate the
electoral system as free and fair to its people. Without electoral integrity, disenchantment
will remain.
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Chapter 6: A Lack of Change in Mexicans’ Daily Lives
Lack ofimprovement in the daily lives of Mexican citizens is a cmcial factor
which contributes to disillusionment ofthe political process among the population.
Despite major changes in the political climate, a crucial lack ofimprovement in the Uves
of most citizens remains a threat to continued voter participation. “Many Mexicans have
yet to experience any tangible benefits from the political and economic transformations
that have taken place”(Rubio and Purcell 2003, vii). Without noticeable progress for
people on a personal level, the likelihood of discouragement with the current political
situation increases. I measure the continually meager and occasionally worsening
Mexican economy using World Development Indicators, survey data, and information
from reputable NGOs.

The Economy
Economics has long been tied to political participation. The welfare ofpeoples
finances affects the way they view their place in society and how they view the role of
their government. Those who are better off economically tend to support whatever
government actions have benefited them, and those who are worse offfiscally tend to
support change. People demand reform when the economic situation worsens in Mexico
(Wiarda and Guajardo 1988). Throughout its history, Mexico has experienced sharp
fluctuations in its economic health, the most recent decline occurring in the peso crisis in
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1994. Though there have been minor improvements,the economy remains weak(Rubio
2004). Parts of society have benefited fi-om NAFTA and related legislation, but for the
majority of the population there has been no substantial economic relief
As long as a large portion ofthe population gains few economic benefits, even
despite partisan regime change fi-om the PRI to the PAN,people are more likely to doubt
the government’s ability to effect real and positive economic change in their personal
lives. As the government takes away subsidies which have sustained the majority ofthe
population for decades, more families find themselves struggling to meet their most basic
needs. If multiple administrations cannot provide assistance to these people, they are less
likely to look to their government for economic relief Once the government is
considered to be too far removed to help these people at this fimdamental level, the
marginalized portion of the population will likely feel less compelled to participate in the
election of government officials, because these elections have so little impact on them
personally. Regardless oftheir political affiliation, these elected officials are unlikely to
fight for change those in poverty really need.
World Development Indicators(WDI)offer one of many ways to gauge the
economic health of a coimtry. WDIs measure development in countries based on a
variety of indices, ranging from economic to social to environmental(The World Bank
2006a). In Mexico’s case, the WDIs overwhelmingly indicate that the majority of
people’s lives are not improving substantially.
Among the factors which may be analyzed in the WDI,the Consumer Price Index
(CPI)offers a dramatic look at the price changes facing the general populace. The CPI is
one of several ways to assess cost ofliving, measuring how much it costs a consumer to
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purchase a given set ofitems. The same items are used jfrom one year to the next.
ranging from food, transportation, housing, and medical care(U.S. Department of Labor
2005). The CPI used here is based on the 1995 value as a fixed value(where CPI in 1995
is 100), rather than the outright or current value for all the items each year. The problem
with simply measuring CPI each year, without using a base year, is that the value ofthe
CPI fluctuates annually(much like the value ofthe U.S. dollar fluctuates, for example).
Using a fixed value from a given year provides a better comparison over time, because
the values in other years are relative to 100 in 1995. Thus, using CPI where 1995 is the
base year avoids distortion ofthe data caused by misinterpreting change in the relative
value of the CPI figure with actual, meaningful changes in the CPI. CPI does not directly
measure whether or not people are poorer or better off economically. It is a useful
indicator of the overall economic health of a country, however, because ofits ability to
chart inflation. The analysis below uses CPI levels to demonstrate the escalation of
inflation, and the resulting higher prices have a negative impact on Mexicans. Ifthe
government does not take effective measures to curb rising prices, the majority of
Mexicans will suffer from a reduced standard of living.
In Mexico, the CPI was 45 in 1990. It had more than doubled by 1995(100), and
had more than doubled between 1995 and 2000, measuring $240. In 2002,the CPI rose
to 268. This is a significant increase in the cost ofliving, and significantly affected the
nearly 50% of Mexicans who lived at or below the poverty line in 2002(The World Bank
2006b). The number of those living in extreme poverty increased from 21% ofthe
population in 1994 to 37% in 1996, when the aftermath ofthe peso crisis had taken full
effect. In 2002, those living in extreme poverty had nearly returned to the pre-peso crisis
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level of20% of the population(IFAD 2005). This means that while poverty has
decreased in the most recent years, it has barely returned to its pre-1994 peso crisis
levels. Some people doubt the validity ofthese numbers which demonstrate reduced
poverty in Mexico. “These poverty figures from the[Mexican] government and ECLAC
are very questionable and even deceptive, because one day someone is extremely poor
and the next day they [sic] aren't,” according to Hector de la Cueva ofHemispheric
Social Alliance (Cevallos 2005).
One of the major threats for poverty stricken people is their susceptibility to price
fluctuations of basic goods. A striking example oftheir vulnerability arose early in 2007.
In January 2007 the price ofcom tortillas—considered a staple in Mexican diets—^had
increased 40% in a year’s time, with vendors in some cities selling tortillas at three times
what the cost had been in November 2006(Mexico Solidarity Network 2007b). When
the price offood staples such as tortillas rises dramatically, especially in such a short
period oftime, families with low fixed incomes are severely affected. As basic items
cost more and the percentage ofthe population that is in poverty or extreme poverty
remains essentially the same, Mexicans who have lower incomes will be able to buy less
and have more trouble supporting themselves and their families.
GDP per capita is another way to measure standard ofliving, usually relating how
well off an economy is based on average individual income. In contrast to Mexico’s CPI,
its GDP per capita has shown little change in the past decade. GDP per capita has only
risen 17% in 12 years (1990-2002), compared to a 496% increase in CPI during the same
time period. While an individual’s annual income only increased by a nominal percentage
based on GDP per capita, the price of consumer goods (like tortillas) radically increased.
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In other words, people’s incomes did not increase at the same rate as the price of basic
goods. Iffood, transportation, and housing costs rise at such a high rate and wages do not
keep up with this increase, fewer people are able to maintain their standard ofliving.
During this period, inflation is sporadic at best, showing no discemable pattern and never
reaching above 35% in a given year.^ From a federal point of view, Mexico’s public debt
increased by 35% ofthe per capita GNP,to a total of 3.4 trillion pesos(Mexico Solidarity
Network 2007a).
Unemployment and underemployment are huge contributors to economic
dissatisfaction. While unemployment in Mexico has remained steady at about 3% over
the past decade according to WDI,some groups speculate that unemployment will not be
reduced in Mexico because its economy—even in the best oftimes—cannot provide an
additional 1.3 million jobs annually for the new people who enter the workforce(The
World Bank 2006a.; Dillon 1999). In 1988, estimated unemployment and
underemployment included more than fifty percent ofthe population(Wiarda and
Guajardo 1988). Current governmental statistics about the rate of un- and
underemployment are skeptically accepted by academics, according to the Center for
Immigration Studies, due in large part to the loose definition of employment used by the
Mexican government(Bouvier and Simcox 1986). The definition ofemployment in
Mexico is a person is paid for at least one hour of work per week. As a result of both
reduced emplo)mient in maquiladoras(predominantly foreign owned factories which pay
meager wages despite extreme working conditions, which in this case employ large
numbers of Mexicans along the U.S.-Mexican border) and fewer smaller firms to employ
^ Thirty five percent inflation is a high rate of inflation for stable, first world countries. However,35% is
not alarming in the context of Latin America, which faced 235% annual inflation between 1990 and 1995
(Bemanke 2005).
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the masses, unemployment rates have not improved under the Fox sexenio. In fact, some
argue that Fox was fortunate to have employment rates remain relatively unchanged
between his entrance into and exit from office (Pastor and Wise 2005). In 2006, less than
one third of the population considered Fox to have taken adequate action to create
employment(Consulta Mitofsky 2006b). Furthermore, those who are unemployed do not
have access to government subsidies like many Western countries’ version of an
unemployment welfare benefit. Numbers estimating underemployment are scarce, and
their reliability is difficult to verify. The Mexico Solidarity Network estimates
underemployment to characterize some 3 million people(though the number is likely
much higher), many of whom do not have retirement packages or health benefits (2007a).
In the past decade, many families witnessed the decline of their economic
fortunes. The average monthly salary for a Mexican family in 1994 was 9,028.5 pesos.
but fell considerably to 6,449.1 pesos in 1996, and in 2000 still had not regained its 1994
peak position when it measured 7,771.3 pesos(Vazquez 2002).
Chart 6.1

1984
Distribution of Wealth
Among Mexicans
10%

□ Top 20% of the
populatbn
B Mid 40% of the
population
□ Bottom 40% of the
populatbn

50%
40%
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2000
Distribution of Wealth
Among Mexicans

2002
Distribution of Wealth
Among Mexicans

Pie charts created based upon data contained in: Pastor and Wise 2005. “The Lost Sexenio: Vicente Fox and the New Politics of
Economic Reform in Mexico.”(Winter)

In 2000, the top 20% of the population earned 56% of household income (Pastor and
Wise 2005). While the top portion of the population’s income percentage declined
slightly in 2002, showing moderate improvement for the middle class under the Fox
administration, the richest 20% of society still earned over 50% of total household
income, as it has for the past 20 years (see 1984 pie graph in Chart 6.1). Without a
marked improvement in wages for the bottom 80% of the population(of which, the
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bottom 40% of wage earners accrue just over 10%),the majority ofpeople are not better
off economically under either a PRI or PAN administration. The citizens need a solution
to their economic strain soon, in hopes ofsteering clear of another economic slump like
that of the mid 1990s. The majority of Mexican citizens remain eager to avoid the same
underachieving economic performance that marked the prereform era”(Pastor and Wise
2005, 157). Only 28.8% ofsurvey respondents agreed that Fox had done enough to
reduce poverty(Consulta Mitofsky 2006b). Only recently has the Mexican electorate
begun blaming its elected officials for economic hardships and holding them responsible
for making changes or risk being voted out of office(Pastor and Wise 2005). But if
neither the PRI nor PAN parties can improve wages, and the PRD lacks the wide support
base to capture the presidency(a mere 6% of voters consider

perredistas, or

strong PRD supporters), there is no party with a realistic chance of being elected into
office to implement changes. Therefore, citizens do not vote for any party, abstaining
from voting because it does not make a difference in their economic welfare.
According to a series of sur\^eys by Consulta Mitofsky, Mexicans indicate that
their personal economic situations are getting worse(2006a). Mitofsky researched the
opinions of 1,200 people over a period of6 years. The table below includes the
percentages at the earliest measured time period and the most recent, and excludes the
more detailed fluctuations between these starting and ending dates(though they are
included in the C.M. survey).
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Chart 6.2
Perception of Economic Situation With Respect to Previous Year
Personal Economic Situation
Nov-00
Nov-06
Economy is worse or just as bad
Economy is better or just as good
Mexico's Economic Situation
Economy is worse or just as bad
Economy is better orjust as good

47.00%
52.00%

59.10%
39.70%

Nov-00
56.6
40.8

Nov-06
65.20%
32.30%

Source: Consulta Mitofsky. 2006. Encuesta: £va/uac/dn final de gobiemo: Presidente Vicente Fox

Between 2000 and 2006, the number ofrespondents who felt their personal economic
position had gotten worse increased by 12 points, with nearly 60% ofthe population
surveyed being dissatisfied with their individual poor or worsening economic state.
According to the survey, more people rated the national economy as a whole worse off
than their personal financial situation. These opinions contrast with official
governmental data, which indicates that Mexico is improving economically. In 1995,
64% of the population lived in poverty, and in 2004 that number had shrunk to 48%
(World Bank Group 2006c.). Perhaps, though the actual percentage ofimpoverished
Mexicans is shrinking, the publicity ofthe economic plight ofthe population is more
prevalent. Immediately after the 1994 peso crisis, the cause of massive poverty was more
obvious and thus was more clearly identified; now in the twenty first century, there is not
such an easy scapegoat. Persistent poverty is a problem that continues to plague Mexico
and will by extension negatively impact its political situation. The dismal economic
conditions of half the population contribute to the reduced number of voters participating
in elections because, after a decade, their perception oftheir personal and the nation’s
fiscal outlook remains bad or is projected to get worse. Ifthe government cannot
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implement reforms which directly benefit the people, they are less likely to support such
a government. As the majority of Mexicans continue their fight against poverty, political
contemplation is an unlikely luxury for them to enjoy. Political involvement takes time,
and many of Mexico’s poor do not have spare time they are willing to give to politics.
These people may be more likely to participate ifthey considered the government to play
a large role in their daily lives, but survey data shows that this is not the case. Unless the
Mexican government makes changes—^particularly economic reforms—^which directly
improve the daily lives of its citizens, it will continue to lose support firom this critical
portion of the populace. Mexicans need a reason to go to the polls, but ifthere are no
prospects of economic benefits through governmental action/intervention, voter turnout
among this vulnerable population will continue to decline.

Land Change
The Mexican landscape has changed substantially over the twentieth century. In
the 1930s, in keeping with the ideals ofthe Mexican Revolution(1910-1921)and the
articles regarding land in the new Constitution (1917),President Lazaro Cardenas
initiated massive land reform which redistributed millions of acres ofland to peasants.
This legislation was widely popular among the formerly landless and tenant farmers, and
incorporated the rural-based peasants into the PRI system. The peasants’ support for the
ruling party legitimized the PRI,because at the time the majority ofthe people lived in
rural areas. During its seven-decade tenure, the PRI specialized in incorporating the
diverse groups ofsociety into its corporatist stmcture, making them dependent on the PRI
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for handouts and continued security. The rural and often uneducated poor quickly
became the PRI’s strongest support base, and they remain so today.
In the second half ofthe century, with the growth ofurban industrialization and a
lack ofrural job opportunities, the demographics of Mexico began to change. The
majority of Mexicans were rural at the beginning ofthe century(Rubio 2004). In 2005,
only one fourth ofthe population was considered rural, and 60% ofthat was categorized
as in extreme poverty(The World Bank Group 2005). In the same time period. President
Carlos Salinas introduced legislation to reduce C^denas’s popular land reform tenure. In
1992, Congress approved Salinas’s New Agrarian Code, which reformed Article 27 of
the Constitution guaranteeing that communal land, called ejidos, which people of a
village jointly worked on and benefited fi-om,could not be sold or transferred. This was
meant to prevent large companies fi-om buying up all the fertile land and thus ensure a
more even distribution of property. Salinas’s strategy ofchanging the Constitution in
order to allow the privatization ofejidos is one ofthe numerous pursuits of a neoliberal
economic strategy that has characterized Mexico since the 1980s. Naturally, as a result,
larger firms began to control a growing amount ofthe irrigable land, forcing smaller and
less competitive farmers to sell their land and work for bigger companies. The growth in
the concentration of large and highly technological agricultural companies has made life
on the surviving smaller farms difficult. What land remains after corporate monopoly
and environmental devastation is usually ofpoor quality and increasingly dependent on
chemicals and fertilizers to produce at all. And the only provider ofthese chemical
supplements in the most rural parts of Mexico is the government.
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The number of Mexicans in extreme poverty fell between 2000 and 2004 by
seven percentage points, but in 2004 poverty was still higher than it was in 1997(The
World Bank Group 2005). While agricultural wages have risen in the past five years.
2003 wages remained 11% lower than they were in 1995(The World Bank Group 2005).
The increased competition under NAFTA resulted in additional difficulties for the rural
poor. According to Rubio, NAFTA “negatively affected virtually all ofthe country’s
traditional producers that failed to adjust to competition fi*om imports”(Rubio 2004,13).
Among the detrimental effects of NAFTA is the shrinking presence ofsmaller firms in
Mexico, which provide comparably morejobs than a few larger firms(Pastor and Wise
2005). Without the creation of more jobs through these firms, Mexico will have to find
another source of new jobs, which is unlikely given the current structure. NAFTA offers
few benefits for the majority of Mexican citizens who are affected by it. “Unless the
institutional and policy elements of Mexico’s development model are corrected, the
average worker will not be able to benefit from Mexico’s export strategy” (Gereffi and
Martinez 2004, 144).
The urban poor face a similar bleak economic outlook. “Evidence shows that the
urban poor still work more but earn less in 2003,compared with 1991” according to
Gladys Lopez-Acevedo, World Bank economist(The World Bank Group 2005). Mexico
enjoys the highest income per capita in Latin America($7,310 according to the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators in 2006), but these benefits are concentrated in the
hands of a select few, due to the tremendous income gap between the rich and poor.
Mexico is among the top four countries for unequal income distribution(Mexico Child
Link Trust 2007). “The richest 10 percent ofthe population earns 25 times more than the
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poorest 10 percent- the same gap that existed 20 years ago,”(Cevallos 2005). (See
Chart 6.1)
These statistics are important because they indicate that, at least over the past 12
years, lives for both urban and rural poor are not improving. Wages remain low, as do
the number of opportunities for employment. People who devotedly supported the PRI in
the past may be coming to the realization that their lives fare no better under the PAN
administration than they did under the PRI. “Nothing has changed,” according to
Guadalupe, one urban poor resident in Mexico City, referring to her persistent struggle to
earn enough money to survive (Cevallos 2005). Now that the PRI cannot distribute what
little benefits(some would consider these bribes) it formerly handed out, the poor have
less reason to participate in the political system at all. ‘What difference does it make?”
questioned Miguel Alvarez Montalvo in an interview with Joel Simon about his political
participation on the election days(Simon 1997, 50). He claimed everyone in his small
pueblo hated the government, and he saw no personal advantage to participating in the
formal political process by voting.
To many poor in the countryside, voting offers no foreseeable or tangible
improvement in their personal lives, since voting in the past has not improved their
economic status. The lack of economic improvement for the majority of citizens in the
past decade contributes to declining voter turnout today, because the populace has begun
to hold the government responsible for the economic status and pimishing it when the
economy does poorly. Economic performance will be a determinant in voter choice for
the indefinite future (Pastor and Wise 2005). Because the economy is not improving at
the rate expected by most citizens, disbeliefin the government’s ability to improve the
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daily lives ofthe people grows. Because such doubt exists about the governing
apparatus’s ability to make a tangible impact on the life ofthe average person,
disillusionment roots itself among the population.
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Chapter 7: Disproving Alternative Hypotheses
Certainly disillusionment is not the sole source ofthis phenomenon of declining
voter turnout in Mexico. In the complex world of political behavior, a number offactors
motivate or dissuade people to participate in their coimtry’s elections. Among the most
influential of these factors are institutions, age demographics,socioeconomic factors, and
group mobilization.
Institutional factors cover a range ofcontributing aspects, including compulsory
voting, the strength of institutions, the number of political parties, the type of
representation in government, and the degree ofpolitical freedom. Overall, Mexico’s
institutions are considered rather weak, without the integrity and transparency needed to
be truly effective. The government needs to combat the abuse of government resources
in order to make itself more legitimate to the people(Estrada and Poire 2007). Some
facets of governmental institutions are helpful in understanding how voter turnout might
be affected. Among these are compulsory voting, concurrent elections, and a umcameral
legislative structure, all of which are institutional variables which increase voter turnout
(Fomos et al. 2004).
Compulsory voting is when a state requires its citizens to vote in elections.
Rather than seeing voting as a freedom, it is instead considered a civic duty which
citizens must perform. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(IDEA)studies show that countries with required voting have a least a five percent higher
voter turnout rate in the most recent election than countries without voting requirements
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(IDEA 2005). Compulsory voting is used as a “disincentive to nonvoting that should
increase turnout”(Fomos et al. 2004,915). Greater voter turnout ideally makes people
become informed about their electoral decision and feel involved in the pohtical system.
‘Turnout is enhanced when voters perceive that they are intervening directly in pohtics’
(Fomos et al. 2004,915). The more people feel that they have a say in what goes on in
government, the more incentive they have to participate in elections. By making voting
mandatory and instilling the idea of electoral participation as critical to functioning ofthe
government, higher voting rates should result. Higher voter turnout in a democratic
country, as previously discussed, also contributes to an affirmation ofthe legitimacy of a
free political system.
Mexico has compulsory voting clauses in the Constitution of 1917, yet its turnout
has decreased in recent years. This is due to Mexico’s weak enforcement ofcompulsory
voting, stemming from a lack ofsanctions against those who do not vote. “Countries
with compulsory voting but without sanctions to enforce compulsory voting also have
relatively low turnout rates”(Fomos et al. 2004,927). With no meaningful sanctions
against those who do not vote, a compulsory voting mle does little to actually affect voter
turnout in Mexico(Gratschew 2001).
Other political features such as concurrent elections have proven to influence
voter turnout. Concurrent elections are elections in which both congressional and
presidential elections are held in the same year. In Mexico,federal legislative
representatives are elected every three years, and the president, every six. The pattern of
voter turnout in Mexico shows consistently higher turnout in concurrent election years.
compared to the lower turnout charted in elections which are only held for congressional
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representation. For this reason, many will mistakenly say that voter turnout in Mexico is
up with every presidential election year, because it is higher compared to the last national
election, which was three years prior and not a concurrent election(Crespo 2003,for
example). From this slanted perspective, voter turnout does seem to improve from the
immediately previous election, but not in the previous presidential or concurrent election
year. Voter turnout in Mexico proves to be higher in concurrent election years, in
keeping with patterns in other democratic countries such as the United States(Fomos et
al 2004).
The legislative structure has also been linked to voter turnout. Mexico has a
bicameral system, with the Senate and the Chamber ofDeputies(upper and lower houses,
respectively) composing the congressional or legislative branch. Bicamerahsm requires
debate between two houses in order to put legislation into law, which requires time and
compromise(compromise being a skill which the Mexican Congress is still learning).
The more time it takes to push legislation through Congress, the greater it appears that the
legislature is wasting time and resources. Therefore bicameralism does not foster
increased voter turnout due to the appearance ofinefficiency. Unicameralism, on the
other hand, is found to correlate with higher voter turnout more so than bicameralism
(Fomos et al. 2004). According to Fomos et al., a unicameral stmcture appears to be
more efficient, thereby increasing voter turnout(2004). When the Congress appears to be
making real progress for society, people believe Congress is doing its job to look out for
the best interest ofthe country’s citizens, and will be more likely to support it come
election time.
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I argue that political institutions such as compulsory voting, concurrent elections,
and legislative structure all influence voter turnout, but not as much as disillusionment
Compulsory voting has existed in Mexico for decades, without enforcement mechanisms,
so it hardly influences a citizen’s decision to vote or not Concurrent election years make
a difference in voter turnout, but that is not a new or developing pattern in Mexico. This
has been consistent over time, with turnout rates in non-concurrent election years time
and again falling below concurrent election years. While turnout is higher in concurrent
election years in Mexico, overall turnout in those presidential election years is still
declining, so obviously the variable ofthe type of election year is not what is contributing
to declining voter turnout across the board. A bicameral legislature is an institutional
feature which works against high Mexican voter turnout from the start. Mexico has not
changed its legislative structure in recent decades, so it is unlikely that bicameralism just
now is begirming to take a toll on voter turnout. If divided partisan power in the
legislature creates an environment which hinders passing legislation, voters will
doubtlessly take notice ofthe lack ofprogress on the part ofthe Congress. However,
disapproval of the lack of progress is only a small part of disenchantment with the
government system’s inefficiency as a whole. Because the legislative structure is such a
small part ofthe bigger picture of governmental ineffectiveness,it is doubtful that it
influences voters to a large degree.
The election environment itselfinfluences voter turnout. The competitiveness of
elections and the number of political parties both have documented influence on voter
participation. More competitive elections foster high voter turnout(Fomos et al. 2004).
The 2000 elections—^where a non-PRI candidate dominated the polls as the favored

82

candidate for the first time—certainly constituted a competitive environment Mexico
has arguably never seen a more competitive electoral setting than that ofthe 2006
presidential elections. Yet, voter participation in Mexico was the lowest recorded in
modem history. Gray and Caul also examine the relationship between turnout and
competitiveness between parties and find little correlation (2000). Clearly, the increased
competition between political parties does not have a profound effect on turnout in
Mexico, thus failing to explain the recent voter turnout decline.
The number of political parties in a country has an inverse relationship with
higher voter turnout(Gray and Caul 2000). This might seem counterintuitive,
considering that with more political parties, people would likely find a party which is
more closely aligned with their personal views, and in turn those people would support
that party at the polls. However,despite having a party which better represents the
interests ofa sector of society, these smaller parties do not stand much ofa chance to
perform on the national level. Supporters ofsmaller parties have less motivation to turn
out at the polls, because their party has such a small likelihood of winning any post of
significance. For instance, in the 2006 Presidential Elections, Roberto Campa ofNueva
Alianza(or ‘New Alliance,’ one oftwo smaller parties which promoted presidential
candidates with essentially no chance of winning the election), asked voters to cast
de tres^^ or one oftheir three votes, for Nueva Alianza, either for President, Senator, or
Deputy. Besides the fact that these new and smaller parties have little chance oflarge
electoral success, some scholars suggest that the transition from PRI-only to an
atmosphere of many party choices might actually have a negative impact on voter
turnout. “Mexico’s transition to multiparty electoral competition might have a
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disorienting effect on public opinion”(McCann and Lawson 2003). Because ofthe
growth ofsmaller parties and the relative reduction ofPRI hegemonic power,it is
possible that previously supportive and involved voters have fallen through the cracks as
political power has shifted in recent years. Not only might voters consider it futile to
support smaller political parties, they believe voting for the PRI will have less ofan
impact, given the PRI’s recent poor performance in the 2006 elections. While the
presence of a greater number of political parties probably does contribute to voter
turnout, disillusionment influences turnout more because ofits greater scope. Ifit were
such a decisive factor, it would be included in public opinion projections based upon
surveys and interviews. Factors such as economic performance, electoral integrity, and
overall government corruption are included in such assessments ofpublic political
opinion, and all three relate to overall disillusionment.
Group mobilization, particularly union membership,shows a positive relationship
to voter turnout. Members of unions vote more often than nonunion members,because a
union connects individuals to a cause through their labor ties and can be used to foster
political ties as well(Gray and Caul 2000). Union membership in Mexico has suffered a
steady decline, with a 28.2% reduction in overall membership between 1985 and 1995
(International Labor Organization 1997). Unions were part ofthe PRI corporatist
structure, which has shrunken considerably in the recent years, particularly since the PRI
had to vacate the presidency. Other types of groups which would mobilize people to go
to the polls are gender, religious, labor, and (obviously)partisan groups. Utilizing these
groups would likely increase turnout at the polls, but the lack of group mobilization could
also contribute to declining turnout.
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Socioeconomic factors have often been tied to voter turnout Numerous studies
find correlations between high voter turnout and high levels of wealth, hteracy, and
education. However,Fomos et al. among others disprove this relationship, showing
wealth in particular has virtually no effect on voter turnout(Fomos et al. 2004). The data
used for this paper supports the Fomos study. Mexico’s total adult literacy level
modestly increased from 87 to 91% between 1990 and 2000, but voter turnout decreased
in the same time period (The World Bank Group 2006a.). Overall wealth in Mexico is
higher now than ever,jumping from a GDP in current USD of$262 bilHon in 1990 to
$768 billion in 2005(The World Bank Group 2006a.). Yet voter turnout in presidential
elections has fallen from 78% in 1994 to 58% in 2006. Therefore, socioeconomic factors
that traditionally have been used as indicators of voter turnout are not helpful in
explaining voter turnout in the Mexican case.
Demographics, particularly age demographics,is another key contributor to voter
turnout. Once voter profiles are compared with those ofthe overall population(by age,
gender, region, etc), one finds that age is a significant factor in voter turnout. The
population of Mexico is overwhelmingly young, with more than 60% ofthe population
under age 30(INEGI2006). The median age of Mexico’s population was 25.3 years in
2006(CIA World Factbook 2007). More than 30% ofthe population is under the age of
15, making them ineligible to vote(INEGI 2006). For the remaining approximately two
thirds ofthe population who were of voting age, some 58 million people were eligible to
vote in the 2000 elections(IDEA 2006). Ofthose, 37 million, or 64%,actually did vote
for president. In a study across countries. Gray and Caul found a higher percentage of
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those between age 30 and 65 voted, compared to those younger or older than that group
(2000).
Because the population is young in Mexico,the voter turnout among yoimger
voters is significant. In 2000,registered voters under the age of30 only comprised
31.6% of voters, despite making up such a large part ofthe population (Klesner 2005).
The highest turnout was among people ages 30-45. Citing Gray and Caul’s findings
about the age range that votes in the greatest numbers,those aged 30-59 made up more
than half of the voters(57.8%)in 2000, despite making up less than 30% ofthe
population (2000; Klesner 2005;INEGI2006). Chart 7.1 below shows the total number
and percentage of people in 5-year age ranges, according to information from the
National Institute of Geographic and Informational Statistics(the source offederal
statistics in Mexico). These percentages have been combined, in accordance with
available information on age of voter turnout in the 2000 presidential election, to provide
a comparison of age groups and corresponding voter turnout.
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Chart 7.1
Age Breakdown of the Mexican Population and of Voter Turnout
in the 2000 Presidential Election
Age Range

Number of
People

0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75-79
80-84
85 or older
Not specified
Total

10,635,157
11,215,323
10,736,493
9,992,135
9,071,134
8,157,743
7,136,523
6,352,538
5,194,833
4,072,091
3,357,953
2,559,231
2,198,146
1,660,785
1,245,674
865,270
483,876
494,706
2,053,801
97,483,412

Percentage
ofthe
Population
10.91%
11.50%
11.01%
10.25%
9.31%
8.37%
7.32%
6.52%
5.33%
4.18%
3.44%
2.63%
2.25%
1.70%
1.28%
0.89%
0.50%
0.51%
2.11%

Percentage ofthe Percentage ofthat Age
Population Into
Group Comprised of
Combined Groups Total Voter Turnout
33.42%

0%(Ineligible to vote)

27.93%

31.60%

19.17%

38.10%

10.25%

19.70%

7.13%

10.50%

2.11%
100.00%

99.90%

Chat developed from INEGl and Klesner data.
INEGI 2006. “Censos de Poblacidn y Vivienda, 1950 a 2000.”; Klesner. 2005. “Social and Regional Bases ofthe 2000 Presidential
Vote.” Electoral Competition and the New Party System in Mexico.

A surprising discovery after an analysis of voter turnout in other coimtries led
Gray and Caul to conclude that lowering the voter age may actually decrease turnout
(2000). In other words,the lower the voting age is, the lower the turnout ofa given
country will be. This is due to the pattern oflow turnout among yoimger voters. Youth
in the United States are notorious for low voter turnout, and the same holds true of
Mexico. The above chart that younger people(under 30)vote less frequently than those
over 30, and so by allowing everyone ages 18 and older to register to vote, a country may
be setting itself up for lower turnout than if it only allowed those ages 21 and older to
87

vote. A substantially large young population with lower voter participation rates will
adversely affect total voter turnout.
While age is a significant factor in voting patterns, the cause of voter turnout in
Mexico extends beyond age differences. Disillusiomnent is manifest across the
population. Evidence for this is provided by survey data, which specifically targets
people of different ages in order to acquire a representative sample. Another way to
illustrate that disillusionment exists across the population is that more than halfofthose
who voted for Fox and more than a quarter ofthose who voted for C^denas chose
“change” as the main reason for voting for their candidate(Klesner 2005). Nearly a third
ofthe total voting population voted for change in the 2000 elections, regardless of which
candidate they voted for(Klesner 2005). Those who voted for change were more likely
to be younger than age 50(Klesner 2005). Those younger than age 50 make up a huge
percentage of the population, as well as a majority ofthe voters. What this group (ages
18-50)thinks makes a difference in voter turnout. It is notjust low turnout among youth
that accounts for the steadily decreasing voter turnout overall. The youth have
traditionally made up a smaller portion of voters than older age categories, so this trend is
not new. What is new is the desire for change among the population, and the willingness
to withhold their vote if change is not achieved. The large number ofpeople who wanted
change during the 2000 election signifies the importance ofinstituting real and lasting
change within the government. Because of Fox’s poor performance,the government has
undergone very few changes in comparison to the expectation ofchange. Because Fox
did not deliver on his promises of“Cambio,” it is logical that people would be skeptical
that the next president could initiate change after Fox had not. When the government
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cannot perform to the expectations ofits people, voters have less motivation to express
their opinions at the polls, particularly ifthose opinions make little difference or have
little impact.
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Chapter 8: Comparing Mexico to the Rest of Latin America
Mexico’s pattern of voter turnout must be looked at in context ofLatin America
to gain an understanding ofhow Mexico ranks among its regional peers. Perhaps the
Mexican phenomenon is unique in comparison to its neighbors, or it might be rule rather
than the exception. Analyzing this comparative information helps contextualize the
Mexican case. I use IDEA International and the International Foundation for Election
Systems(BFES)data to compile a list of voter turnout for all 18 Latin American
countries, and Transparency International’s CPI(Corruption Perception Index)score to
measure relative corruption in these coimtries in the given election year. Chart 8.1 lists
countries with the highest turnout first, followed by highest CPI rating. The higher the
CPI rating, the less corruption is perceived in that country. Plausibly, the higher the CPI
rating, the higher the turnout will be.
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Chart 8.1
Voter Turnout for Latin American Countries in the
Two Most Recent Presidential Elections
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

1999
1999
2004
Uruguay
Peru
2006
Chile
2005
Bolivia
2005
Peru
2001
1998
Paraguay
Brazil
2002
1999
Argentina
2003
Argentina
Panama
2004
Panama
1999
Dominican Republic 2000
Venezuela
2006
Dominican Republic 2004
Ecuador
2006
Bolivia
2002
Ecuador
2002
Honduras
2001
El Salvador
2004
2003
Paraguay
Mexico
2002
Costa Rica
Haiti
2000
Haiti
2006
Mexico
2006:
Venezuela
2000
2003
Guatemala
Colombia
2002
2006
Colombia
1999
Guatemala
1999
El Salvador
Costa Rica
2006
Brazil
2006
Honduras
2005
Uruguay
Chile

Voter Turnout
in Percentage
91.8
90.6
88.3
87.7
87.1
84.5
81.4
80.5
79.5
78.6
77.53
76.9
76.2
76.1
74.1
72.8
72.2
72.1
71.2
66.3
66.2
64.2

CPI
Rating
4.4
6.9
6.2
3.3
7.3
2.5
4.1
1.5
4.0
3.0
2.5
3.7

2.3
2.9
2.3
2.2
2.2
2.7
4.2
1.6

60.2
60
59.3

4.5

56.5
46.8
46.4
45
40.4
38.6

2.7
2.4
3.6
3.9
3.2
3.9
4.1
3.3
2.6

1.8

Source data: IDEA Voter Turnout. 2006.; International Foundation for Election Systems Election Guide. 2006.
'Voter turnout and CPI rating are included for all available years for a given country; blank cells indicate that no information was
available for that election year (either turnout information is not available, or the country was not included in the CPI that year).
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Chart 8.2 below extrapolates some ofthe data above and analyzes it in a way
which is helpful to make comparisons across countries. Average CPI score indicates the
average perception of corruption across the countries in an election year. Perhaps a better
indicator of where a country falls in comparison to others is the median CPI score, which
shows the middle rating of all the countries’ CPI scores. An extremely high or low CPI
score could offset the usefulness ofthe average CPI score, though it is still helpful to
refer to, but a median designates the halfway mark,characterizing countries as above or
below the middle score. The high and low CPI ratings provide the two extremes ofthe
range of numbers within which the countries fall. The same reasoning given for
inclusion of factors for CPI also holds true for voter turnout.
Chart 8.2
A Closer Look at CPI and Voter Turnout Across Countries
3.13
69.4%
Average CPI
Average Turnout
3.3
Median Turnout
Median CPI
72.2%
Highest CPI
Lowest CPI

Chile (7.3-2005)
Paraguay(1.5-1998)

Highest Turnout
Lowest Turnout

Uruguay(91.8%-!999)
El Salvador(38.6%-1999)

Source data: IDEA Voter Turnout. 2006.; International Foundation for Election Systems: Election Guide. 2006.

Uruguay shows the highest voter turnout over the past two elections, and a higher
than average CPI score. Perhaps Chile is the best example ofhigh voter turnout and low
levels of perceived corruption, with the best CPI ratings in all of Latin America. Peru
and Costa Rica(only one election year turnout available for Costa Rica)boast
consistently high voter turnout, and generally lower levels of corruption than other Latin
American countries. Conversely, Guatemala records low voter turnout, with less than
half of the population voting, and a low CPI rating indicating high levels ofcorruption.
These examples make the case for a positive relationship between CPI and voter turnout.
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Exceptions to the theory are evident, however. El Salvador records a consistently
higher CPI than other Latin American coimtries, but has the lowest turnout of all Latin
American countries. Colombia’s voter turnout is less than 50% in both included election
years, but has a higher than average CPI in both ofthose years. Institutional factors such
as compulsory voting and type ofrepresentational system may have greater influence in
other Latin American countries than in Mexico,partially accoimting for some ofthis
variance. A more in-depth study would be required to fully explore these inconsistencies.
Mexico falls in the lower half ofthe list, ranking 23 and 27 out of33 in 2000 and
2006 respectively, for voter turnout. Average turnout in Mexico over the past two
elections is 61.3%, a full 10 percentage points below the median voter turnout and several
points below the average turnout. Four countries fall below Mexico in voter turnout in
both elections, while another four have one election in which turnout was below at least
one of Mexico’s elections. While it scarcely surpasses the average CPI score, Mexico’s
CPI matches the median CPI score in both elections. Based on this data, Mexico is
notably behind its Latin American peers in overall voter turnout, and ranks about average
in terms of corruption. (See also the section on corruption ratings in various sectors and
institutions in Chapter 3, which offers a comparison of Mexico’s institutional corruption
ratings compared to the rest of Latin America and the world.) Mexico does not have as
much economic instability as other Latin American countries, which would likely
influence voter turnout, but the disillusionment with the electoral process remains present
(Roberts and Wibbels 2001).
What accounts for the difference in voter turnout across countries? The aspects
discussed in the ‘Alternative Hypotheses’ section ofthis paper address traditional
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influences on voter turnout. These include age demographics,legislative system
(proportional representation v. plurality, for example), electoral environmental factors,
socioeconomics, and other institutional factors. A common factor is that, during this
wave of democratization, Latin American countries are growing more apathetic and
distrust in the government is increasing (United Nations 2007).
Socioeconomic factors such as wealth and education have Httle impact on voter
turnout in Latin America(Gray and Caul 2000). “[A]coimtry’s aggregate level of
wealth, has no discernible impact on electoral participation in Latin America”(Fomos et
al. 2004, 931). Institutional factors remain key in influencing voter turnout(Gray and
Caul 2000). Compulsory voting has a positive relationship with turnout, especially in
countries with strong enforcement mechanisms(unlike Mexico)(Fomos et al. 2004).
Turnout will be higher in concurrent election years, and in systems with unicameral
legislative systems(Fomos et al. 2004).
The type oflegislative system is briefly discussed in the previous section, but
warrants further explanation here. G. Bingham Powell,the pioneer for comparative voter
turnout studies in Western democracies, argued that nationally competitive districts are
the best for voter turnout(1986). More recent studies have shown that this may not be
tme across the world, however, particularly in Latin America, where proportional
representation(PR)systems prove to be more effective. “The fact that more regionalized
rather than more nationalized electoral systems generate higher turnout rates in Latin
America may reflect the ongoing impact of personalism and populism at the subnational
level”(Fomos et al. 2004,930). In other words, a national PR system—long thought to
be the most supportive structure for high voter turnout—^may be too far removed from
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citizens to be effective at increasing electoral participation (Fomos et al. 2004).
Undoubtedly, proportional representation systems are more advantageous in Latin
American than plurality systems, but having a PR system alone does not guarantee high
voter participation rates.
Closely examining the Mexican case offers insist into voting trends across Latin
America. The threat of declining voter turnout is one that many ofthese coimtries face.
Electoral volatility in Latin America increased during the 1990s, posing a genuine
challenge to democratic stability in this region(Roberts and Wibbels 1999). In order to
preserve democracy in these coimtries, the issue ofdeclining voter turnout must be
addressed. The presence ofcorruption and the effectiveness ofgovernmental institutions
both have a documented impact on voter turnout in Mexico, and this pattern is likely to
hold true in other Latin American countries. By identifying the root causes oflow voter
turnout in Mexico, other coimtries acquire an understanding ofthe situation in their own
countries, with the goal being to reduce factors which have a negative effect on voter
turnout. Insight into the Mexican cases allows other countries to reap the benefits ofthis
knowledge. Preserving high levels of voter turnout is essential to legitimize the
democratic structure that nearly every Latin American country utilizes.
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Chapter 9: Disillusionment as the Key Contributor to Voter Turnout
Declining voter turnout in Mexico plagues overall democratic health by reducing
the legitimacy of the democratic regime. Voter turnout is an indicator ofhow much a
population supports the government itself as well as the system of government The act
of voting itself is an anonymous way for people to influence their government by
choosing who will represent them and voicing their opinion in various referenda. Voting
has broader implications than just choosing government officials, though. It is a
reflection of how citizens see their country and allows them an opportunity to express
their views on a large scale. By not participating in elections in large numbers, a society
sends a clear message to its government that it does not approve ofits performance.
Because universal participation is at the heart ofa democracy, situations where large
numbers of citizens abstain jfrom voting pose a danger to the continuance ofdemocracy.
The greatest contributor to the reduced poll turnout in Mexico is disillusionment,
which manifests itself through corruption, government inefficiency, electoral fi*aud, and
lack ofimprovement in the daily lives of most Mexicans. Corruption is any kind of
misuse of power, and is highly prevalent in Mexico today. The public perception of
corruption is also widespread, as indicated by numerous surveys. Though some data does
not show a direct relationship between corruption and voter turnout, the distrust ofthe
electorate towards its government undoubtedly contributes to disillusionment towards the
government, which is the most important factor in explaining voter turnout in Mexico.
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Corruption which leaks into the government apparatus provides a segway into
government inefficiency. Besides corruption in the government, the Mexican
government is growing more inefficient. The very nature ofthe government structure
hinders high productivity, and drastic alterations must be made to improve efficiency.
Electoral fraud leaves a bitter legacy offiraudulent elections, reducing confidence among
the electorate about the integrity offuture elections. Finally, the overall inability ofthe
Mexican government to produce real, lasting change at a fundamental and personal level
means life is not getting easier for the majority of Mexicans. “Everything may have
changed for Mexico’s politicians, but little is different for its citizens”(Rubio 2004,21).
Without marked improvement in their daily lives, people are at higher risk of
withdrawing from political participation altogether.
Various scandals prior to the elections,“due their magnitude,shocked the public
and called into question the credibility ofthe political parties and the political class at
large”(Crespo 2003, 36). Politics is still considered corrupt and politicians lack
accountability(Rubio 2004). Life today is not markedly different for the average citizen
than it was a decade ago. While “democracy may have radically altered the political
structures, ... it has had little impact on daily life”(Rubio 2004,31). The political and
electoral corruption which characterizes Mexico must be eradicated in order to preserve
Mexico’s fragile transition to a fully functioning democracy. Factors which hinder
democratic growth,such as declining voter turnout, must be eliminated. The issue of
disillusionment must be dealt with if Mexico wants to continue on its current democratic
trajectory.
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Not voting can also be considered a passive way to protest the government
because it is a relatively easy action, Deciding not to vote is one ofthe few tools
citizens have to challenge corruption or fraud”(DID 2005). More than one third of
Mexicans chose not to vote in the 2006 presidential elections, constituting a significant
portion ofthe population who did not exercise their political right to voice their opinion.
“[A] democratic government must be effective or it will alienate its citizens. The absence
of effective government makes citizens cynical and apathetic towards civic activities and
institutions, erodes their confidence and trust in both the government and its elected
officials, and generally leads to a diminution ofthe government's legitimacy and its
authority. The suspicion ofgovernment is reflected in declining voter turnout” (United
Nations 2007). The Mexican people must be re-politicized. This is achievable through
greater governmental and electoral integrity, as well as increased government efficiency
and capability to make the lives of all Mexicans better.
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Appendix:
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

1995 CPI Countries
Country,Rank
New Zealand 9.55
Denmark 9.32
Singapore 9.26
Finland 9.12
Canada 8.87
Sweden 8.8
Australia 8.80
Switzerland 8.76
The Netherlands 8.69
Norway 8.61
Ireland 8.57
United Kingdom 8.57
Germany 8.14
Chile 7.94
USA 7.79
Austria 7.13
Hong Kong 7.12
France 7.00
Belgium/Luxembourg 6.85
Japan 6.72
South Africa 5.62
Portugal 5.56
Malaysia 5.28
Argentina 5.24
Taiwan 5.08
Spain 4.35
South Korea 4.29
Hungary 4.12
Turkey 4.10
Greece 4.04
Colombia 3.44
Mexico
Italy 2.99
Thailand 2.79
India 2.78
Philippines 2.77
Brazil 2.70
Venezuela 2.66
Pakistan 2.25
China 2.16
Indonesia 1.94

2006 CPI Comparison
Country
Finland 9.6
New Zealand 9.6
Denmark 9.5
Singapore 9.4
Sweden 9.2
Switzerland 9.1
Norway 8.8
Australia 8.7
Netherlands 8.7
Austria 8.6
Luxembourg 8.6
United Kingdom 8.6
Canada 8.5
Hong Kong 8.3
Germany 8.0
Japan 7.6
France 7.4
Ireland 7.4
Belgium 7.3
Chile 7.3
USA 7.3
Spain 6.8
Portugal 6.6
Taiwan 5.9
Hungary 5.2
South Korea 5.1
Malaysia 5.0
Italy 4.9
South Africa 4.6
Greece 4.4
Colombia 3.9
Turkey 3.8
Thailand 3.6
Brazil 3.3
China 3.3
India 3.3
Argentina 2.9
Philippines 2.5
Indonesia 2.4
Venezuela 2.3

Note: Belgium and Luxembourg considered 2 separate countries in 2006,together in 1995
Note; Pakistan not used in 2006; it is included in 1995
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